Dynamic tournaments with uncertain length: applicability of the tournament model in promotional tournaments. by Tong, Kwok Kit. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Psychology.
Dynamic Tournament P. 1 
Running Head: DYNAMIC TOURNAMENT 
Dynamic Tournaments with Uncertain Length: Applicability of the Tournament 
Model in Promotional Tournaments 
Kwok Kit Tong 
The Chinese University ofHong Kong 
A thesis submitted to the Department ofPsychology of the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Philosophy 
Degree in Psychology. 
June, 1997 
/f""*X"*^^>V 
jf Vz——…--��,�t \ 
/ V " 學 大 \ 入 
h/统系馆書圖1>^ 
fc/ ‘ " y ^ 
m 2 7 JU[ 1 5 ¾ •！ 
\ , ^ ' - ' l i 
m ~ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ ~ y M 
\\j^ vU5RAnY SYSTEM /勞// 
^ ^ ^ ^ X 
Dynamic Tournament P. 2 
Acknowledgment 
I would like to express my deepest gratitutes to my supervisor Professor Kwok Leung 
for his invaluable guidance, stimulating suggestions, and insightful comments. I am 
also indebted to my thesis committee, Professor Wai Chan and Professor Yuk Shiow 
Lee. Their painstaking reading of, and valuable comments on, this thesis enabled me 
to have a deeper understanding of the work done. Any error in this thesis remains my 
own. Throughout the process of preparing the thesis, my friends, Mr. Potato Cheung, 
Ms. Clara To, and Ms. Jessica Kwong, also patiently listened to and commented on 
my disorganized, rude ideas, and I would like to thank them for their advice. 
Dynamic Tournament P. 3 
Table of Content 
Title P.1 
Acknowledgment P.2 
Table ofContent P.3 
Abstract P.4 






Dynamic Tournament P. 4 
Abstract 
The application of the Lazear-Rosen (1981) tournament model to promotion 
might yield unwarranted results due to its negliance of in promotion's dynamic and 
uncertain nature. Three classes of models were developed to take into account the 
dynamic and uncertain elements of the promotion tournament. The models that based 
on purely maximization could not explain the observed results satisfactorily while the 
models based on decision heuristics were found to be more accuate for dynamic 
tournament. Effort inducement was discovered to be higher in dynamic tournament 
than in static tournament as well. The studies enable personnel decision makers to 
grasp the effects of their promotion schemes. 
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Dynamic Tournaments with Uncertain Length: Applicability of the Toumament 
Model in Promotional Tournaments 
Compensation schemes (methods and systems in giving monetary rewards for 
work) serve as incentives in motivating work effort. ‘Pay is given both to get people 
to work for a particular organization and to get them to perform as well as possible 
once they are hired.’ (Miner, 1992 p.l05) A handful of psychological studies 
concerning monetary rewards in motivating work efforts did confirm the non-
replaceable roles played by compensation schemes (Knoke & Wright-Isak, 1982 as 
cited in Miner 1992; Wagner, Rubin & Callahan, 1988). Locke and Latham (1984) 
even showed that monetary incentives lead to a larger average improvement in 
performance than other motivational techniques such as goal setting andjob 
enrichment. Different compensation schemes, like piece rate, time rate and share rate 
were well examined in the economics literature (Cheung, 1969, 1983); in contrast, in 
psychological studeis the distinction between different kind of monetary-based 
incentive schemes were not stressed. 
Among the infinite varieties of reward schemes, the toumament scheme was 
receiving small attention in psychology in terms of the number of relevant research 
articles. Toumament is special because it is a rank-order-based reward scheme; in 
other words, an individual is paid according to her rank in a contest instead ofher 
output level (Lazear & Rosen，1981). Another distinctive feature concerning 
toumament is its emphasis on the interactive relationship between the contestants. 
That is, one contestant cannot find her optimal effort decision without considering the 
reactions of others ——they are interdependent (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Green & 
Stokey, 1983). However ‘special’ a toumament may be, it could be represented by an 
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economic game defined by game theory (for game's definition, please refer to 
Colman, 1982; Bierman & Femandez，1993). Tournaments exist if they have (1) at 
least two reward levels, (2) at least two different contestants receiving different levels 
of reward, and (3) a limited time dimension for each tournament. A tournament could 
not effectively trigger effort for at least one contestant if the above-stated conditions 
are not satisfied. 
Despite tournaments' extensive existence as an incentive system in industries, 
retails (Drago & Tumbull, 1991; Rees, 1992; Main, O'Reilly III & Wade 1993) and 
sports (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990), it was not until the 
last twenty years did scientific investigations step in — the incentive effect of 
tournament is modeled and tested (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Green & Stokey, 1983; 
Bull, Schotter & Weigelt, 1987; Dukerich, Weigelt & Schotter, 1990; Ehrenberg & 
Bognanno, 1990). Two of the most important developments were the derivation of a 
work-setting oriented rank-ordered model by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and the 
experimental testing on the predictions of the Lazear-Rosen model by Bull et al. 
(1987). 
The Comer Stone: The Lazear-Rosen Tournament Model (1981) 
The basic idea of the Lazear-Rosen model (1981) is to derive an optimum 
choice of effort levels for two contestants in a tournament game subjected to a set of 
parameters constraining the cost function, probability distribution of random shock 
and prize spread (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). According to Lazear and Rosen (1981) and 
Bull, Schotter and Weigelt, (1987)，it was assumed that there were two contestants (/， 
j) taking part in a tournament and they either had identical cost function (even 
tournament) or different cost functions (uneven tournament). The cost function 
Dynamic Tournament P. 7 
relates effort chosen by the contestants with cost — it could be understood as the 
physical and psychological suffering in value terms. Past research usually assumes 
that the cost function increases in an increasing rate (Bull et al., 1987) due to the 
response expansion effect described in Stevens Power law (Stevens, 1962). Each 
contestant had to choose an effort level and bear a cost for the effort level. Reward 
and cost were expressed in the same unit. 
For contestant i 
^ ^ , � effort^ 
Cost =C (eJ = 
constant 
Reward = 7i,M +(l-Hj)m， 
where m represented lower reward level, Mrepresented higher reward level, 71, was the 
probability that contestant i produced a higher output level and e was the work effort. 
According to Lazear and Rosen (1981), the expected payoff for an individual i was 
7r,M + (l-7r,)w-C(e,) 
and e-, = ej = e* if a pure Nash solution (stable and dominant strategy) existed and the 
random shock was evenly distributed from b to -b and the probability density for each 
discrete random shock was ^ . To maximize the payoff, set the first derivative of the 
expected payoff (Reward - Cost) with respect to effort to zero and according to Bull 
et al. (1987), the result was 
* (M - m)c 
e； = e i = e = , 
‘ J 4b 
where c is the constant in the cost function C{e-^ . For uneven toumament, 
a X Cost of effort ； = Cost of effortj 
where a was a positive number showing the cost differences 
According to Bull et al. (1987) then 
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c{M- m) 
e 二 4ba 
J 1 -a M— m 
l + ( ^ ) ( c - ^ ) 4b2 2b 
/^ =ae^ 
In each ofBull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987)'s 10 experiments, 24 participants were 
paired up and required to choose effort level ranged from 0 to 100 in order to 
maximize monetary earnings. The pecuniary rewards they eamed were affected by 
their own effort level, their partners' effort level, cost and a random shock. In 
particular, in each game, the participants were asked to choose an effort level called a 
decision number; and they had to combine it with a random number to obtain an 
output level. Higher decision numbers constitute a higher cost. In each pair of 
participants, the one who attained a higher output level was awarded an amount M 
minus the cost they spent while the one with a lower output level received an amount 
m minus the cost they spent. 
After measuring a total of 12 games played by the same pair of participants, 
Bull et al. (1987) found that the effort levels chosen by the participants were not 
significantly different from the Lazear-Rosen model's predictions in both even games 
(where the cost functions of the two participants in a pair were identical) and uneven 
games (where the cost functions of the two participants in a pair were not identical). 
In games in which the rule discriminates against one participant, Weigelt, Dukerich 
and Schotter (1989) and Dukerich, Weigelt and Schotter (1990) modified the model 
and found support when the toumament was an even one, but they found no support 
for the model for uneven games under the same circumstances. 
Applying Toumament Model in Field and Laboratory Research 
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As demonstrated by Bull et al., 1987, toumament could induce people to work. 
However, one should be cautious that tournament may not necessarily induce more 
effort than other incentive schemes. A proof given by Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
showed that 'competitive tournaments, like piece rates, are efficient and both result in 
exactly the same allocation of resources.'(p.846) Bull et al. (1987) confirmed these by 
experiments: the efforts induced by tournaments were not different from an 
equivalent piece rate system. If this is the case, it would be mysterious for 
tournaments' existence especially when we consider the risky and uncertainty 
involved in tournaments. If tournaments really result in the same motivation effect as 
in the piece rate system while tournaments are risky. The existence of toumament is 
not compatible with the risk averse nature ofhumans. 
Despite all, toumament model seemed to arouse the interest of a number of 
human resources researchers and economists because of its elegant outlook. Drago 
and Tumbull (1991) used toumament model to study the cooperation and competition 
among workers while Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) applied its prediction to PGA 
golf toumament and Becker and Huselid (1992) applied it to autoracing. 
Apart from sports applications, the applicability of the model may look limited 
——most of the issues of interest in organizational behaviors may not fit the 
assumptions of the toumament games. However, among all of the potential 
applications, promotion seems to be one of the best candidate. Promotions usually 
adopt a rank-ordered criterion to determine winners. And as a result the incentives —— 
‘being promoted' — are allocated in a form resembling a toumament. To ensure this 
application is valid, we must examine some conceptual issues in promotion. 
Is Promotion a Toumament? 
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The utilization of the Lazear-Rosen toumament model in studying promotion 
has generated waves of research and enthusiasm, but we have to make sure that we 
apply the right model to the right phenomenon. Hence, a close examination of 
promotion is essential for further discussion. Promotion is a major incentive 
provoking practice that exists in modern societies alongside with output-determined 
payment, supervision, and bonus. Yet, there are only a few theoretical models 
(Malcomson, 1984; Rosenbaum, 1984) that have been developed to examine the 
structure of promotion, especially those being constructed for examining promotion's 
motivational effects. Sociologist Rosenbaum (1979, 1984) pointed out that there are 
two major promotion models describing the nature of promotion in the real world : the 
first one is called structure model and the second one the human capital model. 
Structure model describes that promotion depends on career path; that is， 
promotion is only given to people coming from certain particular positions 
(Rosenbaum, 1979). People working in those elitist positions will be given special 
skills training for high rankjob and offered opportunities for promotion. In this way, 
resources for training are directed to a few particular people only. The model is 
termed by Rosenbaum (1984) to be working under the sponsored mobility norm, 
which prescribes that selection of personnel occurs as early as possible so that the 
system can maximally benefit from the efficiency of specialized training and 
socialization. However, using this model, it would be hard to see how promotion can 
serve as an incentive. Knowing that the chance ofbeing promoted is slim, people 
occupying the non-elitist positions may not be motivated by the promotion scheme. 
On the other hand, people coming from special positions may not supply the expected 
efforts since they do not need to compete. Hence, the structure model only explains 
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the wide existence of promotion in terms of resources conservation in training high-
rank employees, but not in terms of its motivational effects. Human capital model 
states that advancement opportunities are open to all people and people with more self 
investment will have better promotion opportunities. This is called the contest 
mobility norm (Rosenbaum, 1984). Yet, how much would the contestants be 
motivated and how would they actually behave cannot be inferred from it directly. 
Both the structure model and human capital model are descriptive in nature and do not 
address motivational issues. 
Rosenbaum (1984) is among the first to propose an integration of the above 
two models into a single one which is termed the toumament model also by 
Rosenbaum. According to Rosenbaum (1984), ‘ . . . just as physicists use models to 
conceptualize magnetic fields, the toumament model can be used to conceptualize 
career systems.' (p.284). His model describes and predicts situations under which rank 
order is the rule of game. In his model, promotion is a toumament which shows and 
reveals the degree of ability among competitors and functions similarly in a firm as in 
sports; it also describes how different roles and status are keep legitimized and 
allocated as well as the career selection system's progressive differentiation of 
employees from the same cohort group (Rosenbaum, 1984). Some years later, 
Herriot, Gibson, Pemberton and Pinder (1993) also described career as toumament. A 
bloom ofpromotion research came into existence afterward. Here, what Rosenbaum 
and Herriot et al. described as toumament model was not the same as the 
mathematical model developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). 
In addition to Rosenbaum (1984) and Herriot et al. (1993)'s conceptual 
confirmation, promotion can be treated as a toumament in term of its assumptions. It 
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satisfies a number of assumptions stated by the Lazear-Rosen tournament model: (1) 
there are more than one contestant (competitor), (2) the winner will be promoted and 
receive a higher wage (a winner's prize) but not the loser, (3) rank order is the 
criterion of the game — that is, relative output level matters rather than the absolute 
output level. 
From the foregoing account, it seems valid to employ Lazear-Rosen 
tournament model in promotion. Some researchers study compensation to test the 
tournament model indirectly. The general rationale for those studies was that the 
wage differential between two immediate positions could not be accounted for by 
productivity differences alone and should reflect the required reward differential for 
winner and loser in promotion tournaments in order to motivate them to work. Main 
et al. (1993) claimed they found support for Lazear-Rosen tournament model in 
promotion by using data from more than 2000 executives over a five-year period. The 
number of vice presidents could be used to predict wage differential between 
presidents and vice presidents. The differential in wage showing the difference in 
rewards between the winner and the loser of promotion was motivational. Lambert, 
Larcker and Weigelt (1993) also discovered that, by using 303 data, differences in 
compensation levels for the ChiefExecutive Officers and the immediately lower 
ranked positions firms' were exceptionally large that it could not be explained by 
productivity differences. This indicates that promotion provides monetary incentives 
to the winner in term of the wage differential. They proposed a regression model that 
was a combination of tournament model, managerial power and agency model to 
explain the compensation data obtaining from organization. On the contrary, Dye 
(1984) and Rees (1992) questioned and criticized the using of tournament model as a 
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model for step-like executive compensation. O'Reilly III, Main and Crystal (1988) 
also examined the role of payment among top executives and found support for social 
comparison theory but not for the toumament theory. 
Generalization or mis-application: The using ofLazear-Rosen Toumament Model in 
Promotion Contests 
The mixed results obtained in applying the toumament model in promotion 
may suggest the potential fallacy and insufficiency of the model. Some researchers 
argued against the use of toumament model. According to Dye (1984), if the 
contestants are of different capabilities, toumament might have disincentive effects on 
both contestants. The possibility of coalition formation (Drago & Tumbull, 1991)， 
cooperation ONfauta & Hoeksta, 1995) and sabotage (Drago & Tumbull, 1988) would 
undermine the effort supplied by contestants and hinder the applicability of the 
toumament model. Yet, these involve the issue of monitoring opportunistic behaviors 
of the employees (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Malcomson, 1986) and are beyond the 
scope of the model. Meridith and Fried (1977) also stated that the theme of a contest 
and the award structure have to be comparable and compatible. By using a Lazear-
Rosenian term, the targeted effort set by the firms has to be reflected by the 
differences between the winner prize and the loser prize. Otherwise the incentive 
provided by the differences between winner and loser rewards may not be able to 
generate enough incentive and hence, work effort to meet specific goals. 
Green and Stokey (1983) showed that the rank order of an agent's observed 
output net of a random shock is accurate only if the number of contestants is 
sufficiently large because of its inefficient use of information. Leibenstein (1980) 
claimed one would not necessarily perform all the maximization calculation because 
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to select a higher degree of 'calculatedness' brings disutility. It is part of the 
psychological cost. Hence, the toumament predictions would not be correct if there is 
disutility associated with 'calculatedness.' 
Yet, the major critique of the toumament model is its omission of the dynamic 
nature of a game and is not easy to defend as in previous paragraphs. Classic Lazear-
Rosen toumament model assumes that effort decision could not vary within one 
toumament. That is, the toumament players are supposed to choose one and only one 
desired effort level which could maximize the gain. 
Promotion as Toumament — But Not the One Lazear and Rosen Assume • 
In reality, effort decision is not merely a once and for all decision — it can be 
changed. For instance, in the Grand Prix, contestants are evaluated by the 
accumulated scores they obtained across different stations of race. They can set their 
strategies and evaluate their performance after each station of race. Hence, each 
contestant may change her effort level in each station of race. The availability of 
performance information and changing of effort strategies within a single toumament 
is the major difference between the traditional Lazear-Rosen toumament and the 
Grand Prix. We call the latter dynamic toumament and the former static toumament. 
How is the Grand Prix related to our study? In promotional contests, with the game 
extended across a longer time period, receiving performance appraisals (either formal 
or informal) and changing of strategies become possible. The games are no longer 
static. In this sense, it would be difficult to deny that most, if not all, of the 
tournaments observed in the real world are dynamic in nature. Overlooking this very 
nature of real world tournaments, the applicability and generalizability of some of the 
traditional studies warrant another look. 
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The difference between the dynamic model and the static model is that the 
former one enables contestants to utilize feedback information — which serves 
informational and evaluative functions (Ashford & Cummings，1983; Ilgen, Fisher & 
Taylor, 1979). According to Moon (1992), ‘feedback helps individuals to know 
whether the achieved level of performance exceeds, meets, or falls under the goal.， 
(p.l7) However, Campion and Lord (1982) found that when the feedback is negative 
(e.g., in our case, the contestants find that they are falling behind), people would 
either give more effort or lower their goals, (in our case the goals are discrete — 
receiving the winner's reward or receiving the loser's reward). For positive feedback, 
they may either raise their goal (not feasible in our case) or do nothing (Janz, 1982). 
Hence, the effect of feedback information on effort decision in toumament is 
uncertain and has to be tested empirically. 
Keep Working and Be Promoted Some Day 
Another difficulty in applying the toumament model is that the length of the 
contest may not be certain to the contestants nor even to the organizer of the 
tournament. The availability of the senior post is a major factor. For example, 
promotion toumament goes on unless the one occupying the senior post leaves. In the 
tradition model, no account is given to the game's length uncertainty. Yet, to apply 
the toumament model to promotion tournaments, we must tackle this problem as well. 
In principle, if we have no idea about the actual length of the toumament 
(dynamic), no effort prediction can be made. Imagine, if one is promoted, one would 
receive an additional reward worth US$10000 at the present value. If the toumament 
lasts for one year, people might work very hard. What if the toumament lasts for 20 
years? The length of game affects effort predictions even if the reward scheme is 
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unchanged. To solve this problem, the concept of subjective judgment has to be 
introduced. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1982), subjective probability is 
affected by heuristics, e.g., availability heuristic and representativeness heuristic. As 
a result, the past records of the company could be used as a guideline. For example, 
the examination of tenure, department affiliation, and initial position as well as 
employment methods' may be perceived to affect promotion chance (Rosenbaum, 
1979; Cummings, 1984; Sheridan, Slocum JR., Buda, & Thompson, 1990). Of 
course, even two people sharing the same past information and probability 
distributions may have different perceptions in promotion tournaments. To tackle this, 
we have to assess the personal judgments of the contestants before any modeling 
could be made. 
Criticisms of the inadequacy ofLazear-Rosen model (1981) in the applications 
to promotion reviewed in the previous two sections demand extensions or 
modifications before satisfactory and valid predictions of effort levels can be made. 
To sum up, the major concerns are the dynamic nature of tournament in the real world 
and the uncertainty in length of the toumament in promotion. 
Since we have no model for dynamic toumament and we do not know what 
assumptions to be employed. We would examine three potential classes of models 
based on different assumptions and to check them against empirical data in order to 
identify a descriptive model for dynamic toumament. One class is based on 
modifications ofthe Lazear-Rosen toumament models (Multiple Tournaments Model, 
and Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model), which are strongly rooted in 
rationality. Another class is called the Competition models (Competition Model with 
Guaranteed Return and Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum), which 
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are based on self interest and the competitive nature of tournaments. The remaining 
one is the Rabbit-Tortoise Model based solely upon human decision heuristic. 
Modified Toumament Model 
A) Multiple tournaments model 
Although Lazear-Rosen's toumament model does not address the issue of 
dynamic tournaments, it may still be possible that the predictions of the model are 
correct. To tailor the toumament to fit the dynamic situation in promotion, we divide 
the toumament into many rounds and in each round the contestants can obtain 
opponents' performance information. They can change their effort level if they like. 
In each round, the contestant could make an effort decision as if it is an independent 
toumament. For instance, if the winner prize of a toumament is $10 and the 
toumament is divided into 10 rounds, then the contestants are assumed to face 10 
independent small tournaments with $1 reward for winning each small toumament. 
The decision making process for each independent small toumament in this 
model is the same as in the Lazear-Rosen model. This formulation assumes that each 
contestant breaks the complex decision into many smaller ones. This assumption may 
seem arbitrary but it is one of the feasible ways to approximate the dynamic game 
with a static model. We may not have sufficient reason to support an equal division of 
the reward across all rounds of the game but neither do we have strong reason to 
support other division schemes. 
It should be stressed that the original Lazear-Rosen model does not account for 
the dynamic process and as a result, the Multiple Tournaments model presented here 
is just one of the many possible modifications of the original model. We choose this 
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modification because the distribution of random shock in this model resembles the 
Lazear-Rosen model experimented by Bull et al. (1987). 
The winner prize for the toumament is M and the loser prize is m. The 
dynamic tournaments allow contestants to choose their effort level several times 
within a toumament at which their opponents' information is available to each 
contestant. Here, we have two contestants only and the random shock is ranged from 
-b to b for each small toumament. According to Bull et al. (1987), 
(M - m)c 
e = 
4b 
For each block, winner reward = ~ ^ ^ 
round 
m 
loser reward = 
round 
As a result, we have 
(M_m)c 
round e = 
4b 
The total effort = number of round in the game x e 
where b is the range of random shock (as in the section of Lazear-Rosen toumament 
model), r is the number of rounds in the game and c is a constant. The efforts are 
assumed to be unchanged across round if each round of game is independent as the 
present model assumed. 
Likewise, for uneven toumament, the effort level becomes 
C(ej) = a X C(Ci) 






1 + ( ¾ ^ ^ ^ ) 
Ub^ 2b 
e, =aej 
where r is the number of rounds per game. In this model, the effort level for each time 
block is constant. No adjustment for the feedback information — the performance of 
the opponents is made. 
B) The Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
One deficit for the above model is that it does not predict changes within the 
game. Some people would also argue that the Multiple Tournaments Model 
overlooks the fact that the situation may favor one contestant when the small 
tournaments begin. Imagine in the first round, player i has more total output than 
player j, say by 40. At the beginning of the second small toumament, the two players 
are facing an unfair toumament with player i have a 40 rule-advantage. A 
modification of the Lazear-Rosen toumament model is analogous to this condition, 
which may be called unfair toumament model. An unfair toumament is toumament 
where the rule favors one of the contestants (Weigelt et al., 1989; Dukerich et al., 
1990). For example, person i may be required to outperform person j by 40 units in 
order to be the winner. This is called 40-mlQ advantage for player j and the 40-xvXQ 
disadvantage for player i. It should be distinguished from an uneven toumament 
where contestants are not identical in their abilities (0'Keefe, Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 
1984). 
According to Dukerich (1989), the effort level in an even unfair game is equal 
to, 
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1 k 1 c(M-m) 
e： =e-. = ^ X 
‘ J l2b 4b^」 2 
where b is the range of the evenly distributed random shock {-b to b)\ Mand m are the 
winner's reward and loser's reward respectively, k is the magnitude of rule 
discrimination. That is, player i has to lead player j by k in order to win the game, and 
vice versa. When k = 0, the model reduces to the Multiple Tournaments Model. From 
their equations, both the advantaged and the disadvantaged contestants supply the 
same effort level. They are supplying equal work effort since their distributive 
probability density function of winning is the same. 
In our study, people are assumed to divide the whole toumament into several 
rounds (similar to the Multiple Tournaments Model) with the reward for each round 
as — for winner and — for loser. For the second small toumament onward, the r r 
contestant whose accumulated output level falls behind would be assumed to face an 
unfair toumament with ^-rule disadvantage where k is equal to the amount she is led 
by her opponent. Hence, the model for an even game becomes: 
,M-m^ � 1 k 1 c(~y~) 
e： = e： = 7- X 
‘ J l2b 4b^ 」 2 
where e is the effort, r is the number of rounds in a game, b is the range of random 
shock, c is the constant expressed in the cost function and round is the number of 
decision rounds in a dynamic game. 
For an uneven and unfair game, Dukerich et al. (1990) found that the effort 
levels for the two contestants are different, e � i s the cost disadvantaged contestant and 
Ci is the cost advantaged contestant. The Dukerich et al. (1990) model is summarized 
as follows: 
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C(ej) = axC(^i) 
where a >1 
rJ k c{M-m) 
L i — ^ J L 2a J 
' ) _ l + @ ] [ ^ ^ ^ ] -
4b ^b 
e,- =QL6j 
Hence, to modify the above result, the winner's benefit for each small toumament 
becomes — and the loser prize become —. Hence, modified from Dukerich et al r r 
(1990), the effort levels become 
M-m^ 
1 k c("V") 
rJ i- ir I__1 
: ^ 2 b 4Z)2JL 2a J 
j zM-m� 
1 „ c( ) 
l + [ i = ^ ] [ > ^ ^ ] 4Z)2JL 2b � 
e, = acj 
In this model, both in even and uneven tournaments, the effort level may 
change across rounds. It differs from the Multiple Tournaments Model in that the 
previous round's result would be taken into account. 
The Rabbit-Tortoise Model 
This model takes into account the notion of constrained rationality. In exact 
wordings, the contestants under this model do not reform the whole maximization 
calculation since (1) mental calculation involves additional cost as identified by 
Leibenstein (1980) and/or (2) they are not maximizing but they are satisficing.( 
Human information processing capacity is a constraint to maximization behavior and 
the equilibrium has to be reached by tedious calculus and probability manipulation.) 
It seems impossible for people to do all these in a short time. People may choose to 
have a lower, but still positive, retum by using other methods of effort approximation 
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in order to bypass costly mental calculations. This assumption may be termed 
satisfler assumption in contrast to the maximizer one. Decisions are based on the 
contestants' subjective perceptions and desire for simplicity and are constrained by 
the mental abilities. 
Some decision researchers found that single-mindedness occurs in different 
types of decision making processes (Gardiner & Edwards, 1975; Montgomery, 1984 
as cited in Baron, 1994). Single-mindedness is the 'incomplete search for goals' 
(Baron 1994, p.379). Hence, in facing the goals to minimize cost (effort) and to 
maximize the probability of winning in a toumament, contestants may not be able to 
simultaneously take care of the two goals. In addition, the prominence effect ——the 
overlooking of seemingly less important goals ——may also help explain how 
contestants make their toumament decision (Tversky, Sattath & Slovic, 1988). The 
model asserts that when contestants are leading in a toumament, the goal of reducing 
cost may seem more important to the contestants and the motive to maximize the 
chance of winning may be overlooked; hence they would tend to choose a lower effort 
level in the next move. In contrast, when the contestants are falling behind in the last 
move, the goal of maximizing the chance of winning may become more prominent to 
them. As a result, they tend to choose a higher effort level in the next move. A 
toumament is played by at least two contestants; when one of them is leading, the 
other one must be falling behind. Following the prediction of single-mindedness and 
prominence effect, the leading player would reduce her effort while the lagging player 
would increase her effort. The net result looks as if the two players are trying to 
narrow down the gap between their effort. We call this phenomenon the rabbit-
tortoise effect — a metaphor from a famous fable: a rabbit and tortoise is engaged in 
Dynamic Tournament P. 23 
a toumament. The rabbit runs quickly initially but when its opponent ——the tortoise 
—is discovered to fall behind, the rabbit slows down and falls asleep. In the tale, the 
tortoise finally wins the race but in our model — our story, the rabbit would not sleep 
till the tortoise wins. 
From the reason stated above, we would also predict a small or even no 
difference between the efforts offered by the two players in both even and uneven 
games. This testing of the model involves the releasing of the exact output 
information of the opponents and this is different from most of the past experimental 
studies (Bull et al., 1987; Weigelt et al., 1989; Dukerich et al., 1990). By virtue of 
Bull et al. (1987)'s findings in their fifth experiment, different feedback has found to 
have no effect on effort. To ensure the comparability of the two feedback schemes, 
this assertion would be checked again in our pilot study. 
Competition Models 
A) The Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
In the real world tournaments, people may be so engaged in a toumament that 
they utilize the highest possible resources to compete with one another. A toumament 
model is a typical simultaneous game. Tournaments in the real world are more like a 
non-cooperative game than a cooperative game because no enforceable commitment 
can be easily obtained from players. Although the best strategy employed by the 
players would be to cooperate with one another (supply zero effort), we predict people 
would compete with one another for both monetary incentives and non-monetary 
rewards. 
We have two contestants {iJ) in a toumament. The winner of a toumament 
receives M and the loser m where M is larger than m and both M and m are positive. 
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Since the amount m is received by the loser for sure, people would supply zero effort 
for it. The two players, as a result, would compete for the amount (M- m) . If two 
players cooperate with each other, they should supply zero effort. Yet, this solution is 
not a dominant strategy for either player where a dominant strategy is "one that is 
always strictly better than every other strategy for that player regardless of the 
strategies chosen by the other players.’ (Bierman & Femandez, 1993, p.l93) If player i 
believes player j would choose zero effort for (M- m) , player i would choose effort 
level 7. If player j expected player i chooses effort level 1 due to the above reason. 
Player j would choose effort level 2. The decision processes go on until the supply of 
a little bit high level makes the individual worse off. It is equal to the amount of 
benefit (M- m) . In this case, the contestants are not better off nor worse off. 
Since in an even game, both contestants are facing the same cost function and 
have the same constraint on cost. The decision of the players now is to maximize the 
total output level across all rounds of a toumament with respect to the maximum cost. 
If we assume we have a rising function (e.g., cost = 咖 " ~ ) for the effort-cost 
constant 
conversion, then the output maximizing level is to supply equal effort in every round. 
To summarize, with winner prize = M，loser prize - m, and the number of 
round r, each individual has to supply effort to compete for (M-m) . Without 
cooperation, they would compete until the costs of efforts supplied by them are 
exactly equal to the amount ofbeneflt (M- m) . To maximize the output level subject 
to the cost make them supply equal effort for every round of game ( assuming the cost 
function for effort is rising). Hence, the maximum amount of cost they can spend for 
each round is ^ 历.Hence, if the cost function for effort is cost = 咖 " , t h e n ， 
r constant 
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M-m — effort! 
r constant 
“ \M-m “~~ 
effort - X constant 
V r 
where round means decision round in a dynamic game. 
B) The Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
Basically the model is similar to the Competition Model with Guaranteed 
Retum (CMGR). However, we have random shock in each round. Following Bull et 
al. (1987), Weigelt et al. (1989) and Dukerich et al. (1990), we assume that random 
shock is evenly distributed across -b to +b excluding zero. The first round of this 
model is the same as that in the Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum. From 
the second round onward, the random number from the previous round would affect 
the effort of the contestants. In particular, 
effort = . —~— X constantr - random number 
V r 
where random numbers may be positive or negative and are drawn by the contestants. 
That is, if a player draws a positive random number, we would predict that she 
will choose a smaller number next round, vice versa. In this model the contestants are 
fully aware of the optimal choice of effort. When they draw a positive random 
number, they can choose a smaller effort level without reducing their chance of 
winning. Conversely, they would be likely to fall behind if they draw a negative 
random number and as a result they would supply more effort. 
The Present Research 
From the foregoing account, we know that the Lazear-Rosen (1981) 
toumament model is a static model but to model promotion, a typical career 
toumament, this traditional model may not be able to accurately capture the dynamic 
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and uncertain elements. The present study aimed at examining whether the two kinds 
of toumament yielded different results in terms of their motivational effects in 
inducing work efforts. Futhermore, the present studies introduced the dynamic 
toumament process and an experimental procedure for its examiniation. The present 
research also tried to identify models which might be able to describe the dynamic and 
uncertain toumament. Some potential models in explaining dynamic and uncertain 
promotional tournaments were developed to facilitate the organizational decision 
makers to plan their promotion strategies. The effort predictions might help the firms 
grasp some ideas on what would happen for their promotion and salary plans before 
any irreversible action is taken. 
To achieve the above objectives, the research was divided into one pilot study 
and three main studies. The pilot study was a replication of the past studies. We 
would like to check whether our experimental settings could replicate the past results. 
Besides, we also wanted to see if different feedback styles affect effort decisions. 
Study one would employ the dynamic toumament procedure to test and evaluate the 
suitability of the five potential models for explaining dynamic tournaments with a 
certain length of game. In Study two, comparisons would be made between static and 
dynamic tournaments. Specifically, work effort inducement abilities between the two 
models would be examined. A test of the applicability of the ‘dynamic model, in 
static games would be carried out to contrast with the classic model. Finally, in Study 
three, a modification of the experimental procedure was done to take into account the 
uncertain time dimension in dynamic tournaments. In this case, we would incorporate 
the subjective judgment of time by the contestants into the models. 
Pilot Study 
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All ofthe past experiments (Bull et al., 1987; Weigelt et al., 1989; Dukerich 
et al., 1990) measure rewards and costs in terms of money. In our dynamic 
toumament experiments, candies were used as incentives (Experiment A). Besides, 
providing exact output feedback was another feedback system which was commonly 
found and it also facilitates model development. Yet only one of the experiments 
done by Bull et al. (1987) provided exact output information feedback. If the two 
feedback systems (directional and exact output) were the same, then we would like to 
employ the latter for convenience sake (Experiment B). 
Experiment A 
Experiment A of the pilot study aimed at replicating past studies and testing 
the validity of using candies instead of money. It also helped us determine whether 
our experimental findings confirmed those obtained from past studies. Bull et al. 
(1987), by employing the Lazear-Rosen model to predict effort level, found that the 
observed effort levels did not differ from the predicted effort level. In this study, we 
employed the Lazear-Rosen (1981) model to test for static tournaments. If our 
experimental procedure was comparable to that of the past studies, our observed effort 
levels in the toumament simulation would not be different from the predicted value 




Ten undergraduates took part in the experiment in order to fulfill a course 
requirement. The rewards (in terms of candies) they eamed from the games were also 
given to them as incentives. 
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Apparatus 
Random Number Box: a box containing 120 number plates ranging from -60 to 
60 excluding zero for drawing random shock. 
Candies: packets of candies were placed in the waiting room that could catch 
the sight of the participants 
Effort-Cost Tables: Tables showing the conversion between effort and cost 
effort;2 
were prepared. The table was constructed from the equation: cost = This table 
F F ^ 5000 
was called the C5000 table, (see Appendix B) 
Procedure 
Before the experiment, all participants read written instructions in a waiting 
room. Questions concerning the playing of the toumament were entertained by the 
experimenter. Four participants were taking part simultaneously in each session. 
Two of them were paired up without knowing the identity of the pair-partner. All 
participants were sent to different rooms when the experiment began. 
For each game, the participants were asked to choose an effort level, to draw a 
random number from the random number box, and to write them down on answer 
sheets provided. They could examine the cost-effort conversion tables before they 
made their choices. Higher effort levels accompanied higher cost of effort where the 
cost ofeffort was measured in term of candies. The random numbers were from -60 to 
60 excluding zero. The probability of drawing each random number was equal. After 
drawing random numbers, they had to add up their effort levels and random numbers 
to obtain output levels, (e.g., if a participant chose an effort level 60 and drew a 
random number，lQ, then her output level was 50). The participants were shown by 
markings on their answer sheets whether they obtained higher output level than their 
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opponents or not. Tied games would be settled by coin flipping by the experimenter. 
The high-output participants received (3 minus cost of effort) candies and the low-
output participants received (0 minus cost of effort) candies regardless of the random 
shock they drew. For instance, if a participant using the C5000 cost-effort conversion 
table chose 50 as her effort level, then the cost of effort was 0.5. If she finally obtained 
a higher output level than her opponent, then she would have (i minus 0.5) candies — 
that is 2.5 candies. Likewise，if she obtained a lower output level, she received -0.5 
candies. The fraction of candies would be accumulated until they added up to unity. 
Twelve games were played in total. 
Results and Discussions 
From the equation derived from Bull et al. (1987), the equilibrium effort 
j . . 1 (3-0)*5000 1 1 . 1 � • 1 
prediction equals = 62.5 where the '60 ‘ in the denominator was the 
4 X 60 
range of random numbers and the '5000 ‘ in the numerator was a constant taken from 
the cost-effort function. The game was played 12 times and we tested whether the 
observed effort level for each participant in each trial equaled to 62.5 . We had two 
independent variables: Condition (Observed versus Predicted) and Round (12). The 
mean effort level for the observed effort level was 62.6. The mean and standard 
derivation for each trial for the observed effort were shown in Table 1. A repeated-
measures ANOVA (Table 1) was done (the observed effort was tested against the 
predicted value as if it was against a given value), and the main effect for Conditions 
was found to be insignificant (Fj ig = 0.00, p > 0.05). 
The results suggested that the predicted effort level was equal to the observed 
effort level. Hence, the effort prediction for even game in the Lazear-Rosen 
toumament model was supported. The results replicated the findings of Bull et al. 
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(1987) — Lazear-Rosen model could predict exact effort level. Our general 
experimental settings as well as the parameters chosen seemed to be acceptable for 
conducting further experiments. 
The main effect for Round was significant (Fu j ^ = 1.92, p < 0.05). The results 
indicated that people chose different levels of effort in different rounds (trials). A 
careful examination of the means (Figure 1) revealed that in the beginning rounds the 
observed effort level was higher than (and deviated more from) the predicted effort 
level 62.5, which was a constant in all rounds of toumament, in the first few 
tournaments. As the game proceeded, the effort levels observed became closer and 
closer to the predicted level. Hence, people were making more and more normative 
choice when the game went on. Since the parameters of the game remained 
unchanged throughout the game. The only difference between the first few rounds of 
game and the later rounds was the information of feedback (winning and losing). The 
implications were that people may change their effort decision subjected to feedback 
or experience given the same rewards. In other words, the response to a static model 
may not be as static as assumed. The interaction between Conditions and Round was 
significant but it was not of interest since it must exist if the main effect for Round 
exists (since one level of the independent variable Conditions ——‘predicted effort’ —— 
was constant in each and every round). 
Experiment B 
Experiment B of the pilot study tested whether the provision of exact output 
information of the opponents in feedback after each round of game made the 
contestants behave differently than when giving them only directional feedback. 
Although almost all studies in the past employed the latter feedback style, exact 
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output feedback seemed more realistic. From time to time, firms organizing 
toumament display or disclose information in order to stimulate competition; 
individual contestants are aware of the productivity of others. Besides, in dynamic 
tournaments, the accumulated differences in output levels might grow very large since 
the tournaments involve many rounds. Merely giving directional feedback (larger or 
smaller) might be inadequate for determining the exact effort decision of the 
contestants. Hence, we would like to employ exact feedback in our experiment. A 
test of the comparability of the two feedback procedures was essential. 
Method 
Participants 
Eight undergraduates were recruited to take part in the experiment in order to 
fulfill course requirement. The rewards (in terms of candies) they eamed from the 
games were also given to them as incentives. 
Apparatus 
Random Number Box: a box containing 60 number plates ranging from -30 to 
30 excluding zero for random number drawing. 
Candies: packets of candies were placed in the waiting room that could catch 
the sight of the participants 
Effort-Cost Tables: Two tables showing the conversion between effort and 
cost were prepared, (see Appendix B) 
The C2500 table was constructed from the equation: cost =柳" 
2500 
The C5000 table was constructed from the equation: cos/ = 咖 " 
^ 5000 
Procedure 
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Participants were randomly assigned into two groups. The participants in the 
exact-feedback group received exact output information from the experimenter while 
the normal-feedback group received directional information. As in Experiment A，all 
participants read instructions in a waiting room and could raise questions concerning 
the toumament. The experiment would not proceed unless all participants indicated 
that they fully understood how to play. Four participants were taking part 
simultaneously in each session. Two of them were paired up and assigned into the 
same experimental condition. Both of them received the C5000 and the C2500 cost-
effort conversion table but they would be assigned to follow one table and be told that 
the other table would be used by their opponents. For each pair, one of the 
participants used C5000 table and the other used C2500 table. They were unaware of 
the identity of their pair-partner. Participants were sent to different rooms when the 
experiment began. 
The experimental procedure was similar to Experiment A except that the 
random numbers were ranged from -30 to 30 excluding zero. For the normal-feedback 
group, the experimenter marked on the participants' answer sheets to indicate whether 
their output level was higher or lower than their opponent's (pair-partner). For the 
exact-feedback group, the experimenterjotted down the output level of the 
participants' opponents on their answer sheets. (Tied games would be settled by coin 
flipping by the experimenter). The high-output participants received (i minus cost of 
effort) candies and the low-output participants would receive (0 minus cost of effort) 
candies. Ten games were played in total. 
Results and Discussions 
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The descriptive statistics could be found in Table 2. The experiment was a 2 x 
2 X10 (Evenness x Feedback x Round) mixed design. An ANOVA was done and the 
Feedback (exact output level feedback versus directional output level feedback) main 
effect was not significant (Fj g = 2.52, p > 0.05). Hence, different feedback methods 
might not affect the effort chosen. The results confirmed the findings by Bull et al. 
(1987). In other words, providing the participants with exact output figures of their 
opponents might be the same as just telling them whether their output levels were 
higher or lower than their opponents. In our further experiments, all feedback 
information would be exact output feedback for simplicity. 
The Main effect for Evenness was significant (Fj g = 7.9, p < 0.05). This 
indicated that the advantaged contestant supplied significantly more effort than the 
disadvantaged contestant. This was also consistent to the experimental results 
obtained by Bull et al. (1987), Weigelt et al. (1989) and Dukerich et al. (1990). 
However, whether the smaller effort supplied by the disadvantaged was due to the 
process of maximization orjust merely a higher rate of ‘drop-out，in the 
disadvantaged group was uncertain. Figure 2 showed that in the later rounds of the 
games, the disadvantaged contestants supplied an exceptionally low effort level. This 
might indicate giving up after losing for some rounds of game. Yet, the suggestion 
was speculative. None of the remaining interactions were significant (Table 3). 
From the results obtained from experiments A and B, we assumed our 
experimental procedure was acceptable and we used exact output feedback. 
Moreover, the choosing of parameters in the following experiment including reward 
size and random number range would be similar to that in experiment B. 
Study One 
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Before our study, there was no model for dynamic tournaments. However, the 
dynamic nature of real world tournaments may not allow people to use static models 
as approximation (like Lazear-Rosen model 1981). We have examined a few 
candidates serving this purpose. The list of models is by no means complete nor the 
models mutually exclusive. The aim of study one was to test dynamic toumament 
models so as to obtain empirical data for effort levels. Since we did not have any 
accepted model on hand, we would explore five potential models and examine their 
predictions on effort level, (see Appendix A for effort prediction derivations) 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six undergraduates took part in the experiment in order to fulfill a 
course requirement. One-third of them were male. The rewards (in terms of candies) 
they eamed from the game were also given to them as incentives. 
Apparatus 
Random Number Box: a box containing 60 numbers plate ranging from -30 to 
30 excluding zero for random number drawing. 
Candies: packets of candies were placed in the waiting room that could catch 
the sight of the participants 
Effort-Cost Tables: Two tables {C2500 and C5000) showing the conversion 
between effort and cost were prepared, (see Appendix B) 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned into two groups. For each group, one-
third of the participants were male and two-third were female. Half of them played 
even games while the remaining half uneven games. All participants read instructions 
Dynamic Tournament P. 35 
in a waiting room and could raise questions concerning the playing of the toumament. 
The experiment would not proceed unless all participants indicated that they flilly 
understood how to play the game. Four participants were taking part simultaneously 
for each session. Two of them were paired up. 
For uneven toumament, each participant received both the C5000 and the C2500 
cost-effort conversion table but she would be assigned to follow one table only and be 
told that the other conversion table would be used by her opponent and was for her 
reference. For the participants playing even toumament, two C2500 cost-effort 
conversion tables were given to them and they would be told that the conversion 
tables used by them and their opponents were the same. Both participants in the even 
game and uneven game conditions were unaware of the identity of their pair-partner. 
Participants were sent to different rooms when the experiment began. 
Each toumament had ten rounds. For each round, all participants were told to 
write down an effort level and draw a random number ranged from -30 to 30 excluding 
zero. The experimenter marked on the answer sheets the output level of the 
participants' opponents (exact output feedback). Tied games would be settled by coin 
flipping. Accumulated cost of effort was the summation of the cost of effort for all 
the ten rounds of game. Accumulating the output level for all ten rounds resulted in 
an accumulated output level. For each pair of participants, the one with higher 
accumulated output level received (18 minus accumulated cost of effort) candies and 
other received (10 minus accumulated cost of effort) candies. Both even and uneven 
games shared the same procedure stated above. 
Results 
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In this section, each model would be examined individually. The figures 
which may be of interest were the average effort level predicted by the models. The 
mean squared errors between the observed effort level and predictions for each model 
were also assessed as a measurement of fit. To ensure reliability in drawing our 
conclusion, another measurement of fit — mean absolute errors ——was used to enrich 
our tools of model comparison. Comparisons between the mean squared errors and 
mean absolute errors for the models were done separately for even and uneven 
tournaments. 
Observed Effort levels and costs 
For even toumament, a total of 180 observations were obtained. The average 
effort level was 50.5 with standard deviation (SD) equal to 23.6 . The mean cost per 
round spent by the participants was 1.25 (SD = 1.0). The average accumulated cost 
was 12.5 . For uneven toumament, a total of 180 observations were obtained while 90 
of them came from advantaged contestants while the remaining 90 from the 
disadvantaged. The mean effort level for the advantaged was 54.7 (SD = 27.7), while 
for the disadvantaged it was 42.6 (SD = 28.4). The mean cost spent by the advantaged 
and disadvantaged were 0.75 per round (SD = 0.6) and 1.1 (SD = l.2) respectively. 
Models' Performances 
The mean effort predictions for the Multiple Tournaments Model (MTM), 
Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model (CMTM), Rabbit Tortoise Model (RTM), 
Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum (CMGR) and Moving Competition 
Model with Guaranteed Retum (MCGR) could be found in Table 4 (for even game) 
and Table 5 (for uneven game). 
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The Mean Squared Errors (MSE) [ (observed - predicted)^ ] between the 
predicted efforts and the observed efforts were measured as measurement of fit. The 
MSE for even games and uneven games across models could be found in Table 4 and 
Table 5 respectively. Table 5 also separately presents the MSE for the advantaged 
and the disadvantaged. 
As another measure of fit, the Mean Absolute Errors (MAE) [ | observed -
predicted | ] between the prediction on efforts and the observed efforts were 
calculated. For all the models studied, the MAE varied. For even games, the MAE 
for the models could be found in Table 4 while for uneven games, the MAE was 
shown in Table 5. The summary of models' performance for the advantaged and 
disadvantaged could also be found in Table 5. 
For even games, several (10 x 2 x 2) ANOVAs were done to examine whether 
the models' predictions deviated from the observed effort levels. Round was the 
within subject variable with 10 levels while another within subject independent 
variable was Condition with two levels (Observed vs. Predicted). For uneven games, 
an additional variable Evenness was added. 
Multiple Tournaments Model 
For the even games, the Round main effect and Round-Condition interaction 
was not significant (F9153 = 1.62, p > 0.05) and (F9j53 = 1.62, p > 0.05) respectively while 
the Condition main effect was significant (F1j7 = 266.78, p < 0.01). It might indicate 
that the predictions of this model did not fit the observed effort levels. We repeated 
the ANOVA but used only data from the third round to the tenth round to reduce 
effort flustration in the initial two rounds. The results showed that the Condition main 
effect was still significant (F117 = 207.74, p < 0.01) for even games (Figure 3). 
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For uneven games, none of the interaction effects was significant. The main 
effects for Evenness and Round were also insignificant while the Condition main 
effect was significant (Fu^ = 62.04 , p < 0.01). By using only the data from the 
advantaged participants, the Condition main effect was significant (Fi g = 24.33, p < 
0.01) (Figure 4)，while for the disadvantaged, the Condition main effect was 
significant as well (Fi g = 47.17, p < 0.01) (Figure 5). 
Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
For even games, the Round main effect was significant (F9j53 = 3.07, p < 0.05) 
and Round-Condition interaction was not significant (F9153 = 0.82, p > 0.05). The 
model predictions deviated from the observed effort levels: the main effect for 
Condition was significant (F117 = 663.45, p < 0.01). We used the data from the third 
round to the tenth round and did the ANOVA again. The results showed that the 
Condition main effect was still significant (F117 = 564.79, p < 0.01). It might indicate 
that the predictions of this model could not fit the observed effort levels (Figure 3). 
For uneven game, neither the Round nor the Evenness main effects were 
significant. The interactions also showed insignificant results. The Condition main 
effect was significant (F^g = 98.03，p < 0.01). The predictions of the model did not fit 
the observed effort levels. By using only the advantaged participants' and 
disadvantaged participants' data, the Condition main effect was also significant, (Fj g 
=42.39, p < 0.01) (Figure 4) and (Fi g = 67.74, p < 0.01) (Figure 5) respectively. It 
indicated that the model did poorly in effort prediction for both advantaged and 
disadvantaged contestants. 
Rabbit-Tortoise Model 
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The Round main effect and Round-Condition interaction was not significant 
(F9153 = 1.75, p > 0.05) and (F9153 = 0.54, p > 0.05) respectively while Condition main 
effect was significant (Fj iy = 25.87, p < 0.01). We repeated the ANOVA again with 
the data from the third round to the tenth and the results showed that the Condition 
main effect was still significant (Fi u = 17.90，p < 0.01). It indicated that the 
predictions of this model did not fit the observed effort level perfectly (Figure 3). 
For uneven game, both the main effects for Evenness and Round were 
insignificant. All of the interaction effects were also not significant except the 
Evenness-Condition interaction (Fu6 = 5.35, p < 0.05). The Condition main effect was 
not significant (F! i6 = 0.00 , p > 0.05) and it might reveal that the model predictions 
were not deviated from the observed effort levels. The predictions of the model did 
better than MTM and CMTM. By using the data from the advantaged participants 
and for the disadvantaged only, the Condition main effects also were not significant, 
(Fi 8 = 2.43，p > 0.05) (Figure 4) and (Fi s = 2.98, p > 0.05) respectively (Figure 5). 
The Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
For even toumament, the Round main effect and Round-Condition interaction 
was non significant (F9 "3 = 1.62, p > 0.05) and (F9j53 = 1.62，p > 0.05) respectively 
while the Condition main effect was significant (F117 = 7.71, p < 0.05). However, by 
using data from the third round to the tenth round, the Condition main effect was not 
significant (F1j7 = 2.67, p > 0.05). The model seemed to be able to explain the 
observed effort levels (Figure 3). 
For uneven toumament, the Round main effect and all the interaction effects 
were not significant while the Evenness main effect was significant (Fu6 = 11.19, p < 
0.05). It might be due to the gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged effort 
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levels from the model's prediction. The Condition main effect was not significant 
(Fj i6 = 1.37 , p = 0.259). By using only the advantaged participants' and disadvantaged 
participants' data, the Condition main effect was also not significant, (Fj g = 1.25, p > 
0.05) (Figure 4) and (F^ g = 0.18, p > 0.05) respectively (Figure 5). 
Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
For even toumament, the Round main effect was not significant (F9 ,53 = l.61, p 
> 0.05). The Round-Condition interaction was significant (F9153 = 1.96, p = 0.05) and 
from Figure 3 we know that the model's predictions were closer to the observed effort 
level in later rounds of games, but not the earlier rounds. The Condition main effect 
was significant (F117 = 7.31, p > 0.05). Once again, we repeated the ANOVA but 
using the data from the third round to the tenth. The results showed that the Condition 
main effect became not significant (F117 = 1.28, p > 0.05). The model seemed to be 
able to explain the observed effort to a certain degree (Figure 3). 
For uneven toumament, the Round main effect and all the interaction effects 
were not significant while the Evenness main effect was significant (Fi i6 = 11.25, p < 
0.05). It might also be due to the gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged 
effort levels from the model's prediction. The Condition main effect was significant 
(Fi i6 = 1.54 , p > 0.05). The predictions of the model fit the observed effort levels. By 
using only the advantaged participants' data, the Condition main effect was also not 
significant (Fi g = 1.23, p > 0.05) (Figure 4), while for the disadvantaged, the Condition 
main effect was not significant as well (F^ g = 0.32, p > 0.05) (Figure 5). 
Comparisons 
The MSE for even tournaments were tested across the fIve models. A (Model 
(5) jc Round {10)) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the five models with 
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the MSE as the dependence variable (Table 6a). The Round main effect was not 
significant (F9153 = l.ll, p > 0.05). It indicated that the MSE in different rounds were 
the same. The interaction effect was significant (F36 6i2 = 1.93, p < 0.01) and this implied 
that in some rounds some models have larger MSE. The differences in MSE across 
models were significant (F4 68 = 49.66, p < 0.01). Specifically, the MSE for CMTM > 
MTM > RTM > MCGR > CMGR. Scheffe tests were performed. All comparisons showed 
significant differences except the comparisons between CMGR and MCGR, and 
MCGR and RTM (Table 7a). Hence, the CMGR seemed to produce the smallest 
MSE and it may be the best model among the five. 
As another comparison for the measurements of the fit for even toumament, a 
(5 jc 10) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the five models with the MAE 
as the dependence variable by using Round and Model as independent variables 
(Table 6b). Similar to the comparison ofMSE, the main effect for Round was not 
significant (F9153 = 1.01, p > 0.05) while the interaction effect between Round and Model 
was significant (F36,6i2 = 2.46, p < 0.01). The differences in MAE between models 
(Model main effect) were significant (F4 68 = 38.65, p < 0.01). Overall, MAE for CMTM 
> MTM > RTM > MCGR > CMGR. Scheffe tests were done (Table 7b). When taking into 
consideration ofMSE and MAE as well as the effort derivation together, the models' 
performance in descending order was CMGR, MCGR, RTM, MTM, CMTM. 
A repeated-measures ANOVA (Evenness as between subject variable, Model 
and Round as within subject variables) with the MSE as the dependent variable was 
done to test whether different models produced different MSE (Table 8a). The main 
effect for Evenness was not significant (Fi jg = 0.13，p > 0.05). It indicated that, overall, 
the errors in predictions for either the advantaged and disadvantaged contestants were 
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equal. As indicated by the main effect of Model, the differences in MSE between 
different models were significant (F4 712 = 44.99, p < 0.01). Scheffe tests were 
performed. The results were shown in Table 9a. The MSE for MTM was equal to 
RTM while the MSE for CMGR and MCGR were also the same. 
Another repeated-measures ANOVA {Evenness as between subject and Model 
as within subject variables) were performed on the five models for uneven toumament 
with MAE as the dependent variable (Table 8b). The main effect for Evenness was 
not significant (Fj i^  = 0.20, p > 0.05). The differences in MAE across models were 
significant (F4 64 = 8.38, p < 0.01). Scheffe tests were performed (Table 9b). When 
taking into account both the MSE and MAE, the models' performance in descending 
order was CMGR = MCGR > RTM = MTM = CMTM. 
Discussions 
From the results, the two Competition models seemed to perform better than 
the other models. They had the smallest MSE as well as MAE. The performance of 
the Rabbit Tortoise Model fell between the Competition models and the Multiple 
Tournaments Models since it performed as good as the two competition models in 
uneven toumament but not in even toumament. Besides, only the effort levels from 
the two Competition models were identical to the observed effort levels for both even 
and uneven toumament. For the Rabbit Tortoise Model, the model predicted 
correctly only in uneven toumament but not in even toumament. Even though some 
might argue that the non significant difference found between the comparisons 
between the observed effort levels and effort predictions for the Competition Model 
might be due to large variance, the claim had to be rejected since the variance for 
effort prediction for the Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum was zero (it was 
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a point prediction). The results could at least suggest that the Competition Model 
with Guaranteed Retum was better than the remaining models in explaining dynamic 
tournaments. 
From the experiments, the effort variation for even toumament was smaller 
than that in the uneven toumament (see Table 4 and Table 5). This confirmed the 
results from the past studies (Weigelt et al., 1989). One possible reason for the higher 
variations in uneven tournaments might be the drop out problem for the disadvantaged 
where the lagging contestant lowered her goal and became unmotivated to win the 
game. (Campion & Lord，1982). The reason why some of the lagging contestants 
choose to drop out (e.g., choose zero effort in the last few rounds of game) might be 
attributed to their personalities. With limited knowledge on the issue, further 
investigations have to be pursued. One implication for this finding is that in 
promotion, which is a dynamic toumament, the expected motivation inducement may 
not tum out to be the way the firm expects since we have higher variation in dynamic 
uneven toumament. The morale of the employees has to be ensured and their 
attitudes toward competitions should be assessed. Otherwise, the application of 
promotion tournaments or performance contests might adversely affect the 
performance plans of a firm with unpredictable productivity. 
Compared to the two Multiple Tournaments Models, the Rabbit Tortoise 
Model performed much better in terms ofMSE and MAE, but worse than the 
Competition models. The inability of the model to give correct prediction in even 
toumament relative to that in the uneven toumament might seem paradoxical since to 
predict effort in uneven toumament, which involves an additional consideration on 
abilities differences, seems to be more difficult. A speculation offered is that difficult 
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or complex decisions involve more mental resources, and approximations on effort 
decision instead ofcalculation were used for convenience sake. This assertion could 
be examined in details in study three where the decision making becomes even more 
complex. 
As the results indicate, both the Multiple Tournaments Model and the 
Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model could not give us accurate predictions on 
effort levels. For the case of the Multiple Tournaments Model, the significant 
difference between the predicted effort and observed effect might suggest that the 
static nature of the toumament model could not account for the dynamic data. The 
effect of feedback might lead individuals to be aware of whether their performance 
meets their expected effort goals (Moon, 1992). As a result, they change their 
strategies in the course of the game (Campion & Lord, 1982) and the static model 
becomes inadequate. For the Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model, the 
inadequacy of the ‘unfair model' itself might be the reason why it did not work. In 
Weigelt et al.'s experiment where the ‘unfair，model was originally developed，the 
model was found to understate the observed effort level (Weigelt et al., 1989). Now 
both the Multiple Tournaments Model and the Cumulative Multiple Tournaments 
Model share the same problem of understating effort. It is consistent with the past 
findings in unfair toumament. This might indicate that the 'marginal' maximization 
style in the toumament model may not work in a dynamic process where all 
contestants could change their efforts in the course of competition. The dynamic 
competition forced contestants to supply effort level higher than the ‘marginally 
maximizing' level where it was desirable but may not be feasible in a dynamic 
toumament. Detailed discussion would be provided in study two. 
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The two Competition models' success in predicting dynamic process might 
also be due to the fact that the competitions between contestants are assumed (all-or-
nothing maximizing instead of marginal maximizing is used). And this competition 
assumption resembles the situation in the dynamic toumament. In this sense, the 
Competition models are mutually exclusive with the Multiple Tournaments Models. 
The results supported the Competition models and hence its assumption that dynamic 
toumament is more akin to an all-or-nothing game then a marginal maximizing game. 
Since the Competition models are rational choice models in which the effort decision 
makers are making choices that they perceive to be the best for them, we could infer 
that the effort level supplied by the employees in promotion toumament, which 
resembles a dynamic toumament, could also be accounted for by the Competition 
model. As a result, the firms could have a better planning on cost and profit in 
utilizing promotion or performance contest as a work incentive. The firm could also 
strategically plan whether to allow contestants with different abilities to take part in 
the same promotion or performance contest. They could weight the value ofbeing 
fair against the expected productivity loss for the uneven toumament (for participants 
using C2500 table in our experiments, the one who face even competition supplied 50.5 
efforts while the those who belonged to the disadvantaged category supplied 42.6). 
Study Two 
Since the best model in the dynamic toumament experiment ——Competition 
Model with Guaranteed Retum — employs assumptions different from the classic 
toumament model. Since the static toumament model failed to generalize to the 
dynamic toumament, it is interesting to generalize the Competition Model in addition 
to other dynamic models in a static toumament. Specifically, we would like to see if 
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the models that contain ‘irrational’ element or psychological considerations could out-
perform purely rational model. In addition we would examine if there is any 
difference in actual effort levels between dynamic game and static game given the 
same reward scheme since it could help us test the predictions of the models. 
Viewing from the Multiple Tournaments model, the efforts supplied by the 
contestants in dynamic and static games would be the same. For the Cumulative 
Multiple Tournaments Model, dynamic games would produce lower effort level 
(except the case in which output level between the two contestants is the same for 
each and every round). For the Tortoise-Rabbit model, the efforts supplied in even 
games are equal for both dynamic tournaments (Discrepancy between the lucky 
contestants who draw higher random number and the unlucky one to the average 
summed up to zero) and static tournaments but the efforts supplied in uneven games 
are higher for the disadvantaged contestants and are lower for the advantaged 
contestants. For the two Competition models, the effort supplied for dynamic 
tournaments would be higher in both even and uneven games than static games 
(enables one to win some or lose for some of the rounds, where each round is 
independent and the contestants maximize the benefit marginally) since it assumes all-
or-nothing situation (winning or losing for all rounds, where the contestants maximize 
the benefit on an average basis) for the contestants and as a result the whole of the 
benefit (M- m) would be dissipated (or, competed ——it is the maximum additional 
amount the contestants are willing to forgone in order to win) due to competition. 
Hence, the comparison between the dynamic model and static model also helps us 
examine the models from another angle. From our results in study one that the two 
Competition Models are a better approximation to the dynamic toumament, we 
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predicted the effort levels supplied by the participants in static tournaments would be 
lower than those in dynamic tournaments in study one even though the same 
parameters ofrewards sizes were used for the two studies. Due to limitation of 
participants, only even static tournaments were performed and the results obtained 
would be compared with those of study one. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighteen undergraduates took part in the experiment in order to fulfill a course 
requirement. The rewards (in terms of candies) they eamed from the games were also 
given to them as incentives. 
Apparatus 
Random Number Box: a box containing 60 number plates ranging from -30 to 
30 excluding zero for drawing random shock. 
Candies: packets of candies were placed in the waiting room that could catch 
the sight of the participants 
Effort-Cost Tables: Tables showing the conversion between effort and cost 
were prepared. The table was constructed from the following equation : cos/ = : ; ; 
This table was called the C2500 table, (see Appendix B) 
Procedure 
Static tournaments were played and the experimental procedure was similar to 
that in the pilot study experiment A. The random numbers ranged from -30 to 30 
excluding zero. The feedback was exact-output feedback. The high-output 
participants received {1.8 minus cost ofeffort) candies and the low-output participants 
received (7 minus cost of effort) candies. Ten games were played in total. 
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Results 
A total of 180 observations were obtained. The mean observed effort level for 
the static toumament was 34.1 (SD = 22.7) and the mean cost spent was 0.73 (SD = 0.66). 
The even tournaments' data from study one were borrowed and compared to the data 
of static toumament in this study. A repeated-measures ANOVA with Round as 
within subject variable and Condition (static versus dynamic) as between subject 
variable showed that the work effort supplied by the static toumament in study two 
was smaller than the effort in study one: Condition main effect was significant (F134 = 
13.3, p < 0.05). The main effect for Round was also significant (F9 306 = 5.99, p < 0.05). 
It indicated that the efforts supplied to different rounds were different. As shown in 
Figure 6, the last few rounds of game had lower average effort levels than the first few 
rounds. The interaction effect between Round and Condition was not significant 
( F 9 3 0 6 = O.37,p = O.948). 
The data for static toumament was used to test the ‘dynamic, models. Only 
three ‘dynamic’ models were assessed since the two Multiple Tournaments Models 
were reduced into the Lazear-Rosen Toumament Model (TM). 
The Performance ofModels 
The effort predictions for TM, RTM, CMGR and MCGR were 16.67 
(constant), 37.3 (SD = 29.0), 44.7 (constant), and 55.7 (SD = 728.7) respectively. The 
models' prediction, MSE and MAE are found in Table 10. Figure 6 compares the 
average observed effort levels supplied by the participants with the average effort 
level observed per round. 
Comparisons 
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A repeated-measures ANOVA (within subject variables Model with 5 levels 
and Round with 10 levels) was done with MSE as the dependent variable (Table 1 la). 
The main effect for Model was significant (F3 51 二 3.80, p < 0.05). Post-hoc 
comparisons (Scheffe) were done and the results were summarized in Table 12a. 
Statistically, all models were the same except the MCGR which had significantly 
higher MSE. 
Another repeated-measures ANOVA (within subject variables Round with 10 
levels and Model with 5 levels) was done with the MAE as the dependent variable 
(Table 1 lb). The main effect for Model was significant (F3 51 = 2.95, p < 0.05). Post-
hoc (Scheffe) comparisons' results were shown in Table 12b. Statistically, MAE for 
all the models were the same. 
Discussion 
From the results, we know that by using the data from study one for 
comparison, the effort supplied by the static toumament in the present study is smaller 
(Fi 34 = 13.3, p < 0.05). The interesting fact is that both studies rewarded a total of 18 
candies to the winner and a total of 10 candies to the loser while the total number of 
rounds as well as the random shock spread are identical for the two studies, but the 
effort induements were different. As a result, we could conclude that dynamic 
toumament can induce more effort than the static toumament. 
For static tournaments, according to Lazear-Rosen Model (1984) the effort 
levels were chosen by equating the marginal benefit of increasing an effort level to the 
additional cost of increasing an effort level. However, if the ‘maximizing‘ (best) effort 
choice could be alternated by the informed actions of others as in the case of dynamic 
toumament, then it might not be the best effort level any more. For instance, if 
Dynamic Tournament P. 50 
according to the maximizing effort level an individual is entitled to an expected 
reward $10, the feedback on the effort supplied by others might prompt her to eam a 
little bit less than $10 in order to win. She does this by increasing the effort level with 
reference to the opponent's output level in the next round of game. In dynamic 
toumaments, the feedback in previous rounds facilitates the snow-balling and finally it 
leads to a higher total effort supplied by the contestants. In contrast, for static 
toumament, each game is independent and as a result, effort snow-balling might not 
be found or has a smaller impact. Hence, we suspect that promotion toumament could 
induce people to work harder than piece rate since the effort inducement ability for 
piece rate and static toumament is similar. 
This phenomenon helps us to explain why we have extensive existence of 
promotion toumament as well as performance contest despite the fact that Lazear and 
Rosen (1981) and Bull et al. (1987) showed that piece rate and toumament are the 
same in terms of their effort motivational ability. It may be tme that static 
toumaments and piece rate are the same but in the real world toumaments are mostly 
dynamic in nature where feedback is possible. This explained why toumaments are 
used for effort inducement (Parker, 1982) despite they involve risk and uncertainty. 
Some may ask why then we still employ piece rate compensation scheme. A 
speculation is that the marginal benefit ofutilizing toumaments to induce work effort 
may decrease when more and more toumaments are employed while the cost of using 
toumament (e.g. stress and drop out) increases when more and more toumaments are 
used. Hence, there exists a boundary that enables the co-existence for toumament and 
piece rate. 
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As an exploratory step, the dynamic models were also applied to static 
condition to see their explaining power. It was surprising that the Competition Model 
with Guaranteed Retum, the Rabbit Tortoise Model and the Lazear-Rosen Model 
were of comparable performance since we would predict the Lazear-Rosen model 
should be the best model. The results were the same whether we used MSE or MAE 
as the indicator of goodness of fit. As in study one, the random shock for the effort 
predictions was zero for both Lazear-Rosen Model and Competition Model with 
Guaranteed Retum; hence, the superiority of the latter model than the former could 
not be attributed to variance difference. We offer two explanations. 
First, the effort levels predicted by the toumament models were lower than the 
observed effort level. Although the finding was uncommon in fair toumament, it was 
considered a fact in uneven unfair (Weigelt et al., 1989; Dukerich et al., 1990). To 
account for this, we speculate there might be non-monetary reward which the 
calculation of expected reward overlooks. The gap between the winner's and the 
loser's rewards is enlarged. As a result, the contestants look as if they 'oversupplied' 
efforts. The satisfaction coming from winning the game may be one of the non-
pecuniary rewards. Even though in the course of the experiment, the one who win the 
toumament was called higher-output person instead of winner, the participants might 
still attach good feelings to being a high-output person. 
Second, the feedback for static tournaments may sometimes have effects on 
the contestants. A losing-too-much participant may 'irrationally' supply higher effort 
in a round of game in order to win a game without considering the gain. This 
explanation comes from some discussions with the participants supplying abnormally 
high output levels in some rounds in the toumament. 
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The superiority of the Competition Model with Guaranteed Return here and in 
study one indicates that the assumption of competition is a more appropriate 
assumption for tournaments. Hence, no matter promotion tournaments are 
constructed as dynamic or static，their effects on productivity inducement are beyond 
question. 
Study Three 
In the real world, the length of promotion toumament sometimes is uncertain. 
Promotion may not be granted if the ones occupying the senior positions are not 
moved vertically or horizontally. The uncertainty arisen should be taken into account 
in constructing a model for promotion toumament. In modeling, the uncertainty on 
the actual round of games would make predictions impossible for all our models (See 
Appendix A for modeling and models' predictions). Estimations may be obtained by 
asking the participants their subjective judgment of the length of games or based on 
the probability distribution offered to them since Beach and Braun (1994) reviewed 
that using objective probability might not be accurate since different people's 
backgrounds might affect their subjective judgment and decision making reference. 
Generally, the longer the expected round, the smaller the expected reward. Hence, the 
resulting effort levels would be lower as well. 
As discussed in study one, we expected that the performance of the Rabbit 
Tortoise Model would improve when the nature of decision making becomes more 
and more complex. Hence, in decision making involving uncertainty, we expect the 
Rabbit Tortoise Model would perform much better. For the Competition models, we 
do not have any reason in suspecting its predictability in the present study since they 
are the better models in study one. From the results in study one, the performance of 
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the Multiple Toumaments Models would be expected to be unsatisfactory due to its 
underestimation of effort levels in a dynamic game where marginal maximizing is not 
the rule of the game. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six undergraduates took part in the experiment in order to fulfill a 
course requirement. One-third of them were male. The rewards (in terms of candies) 
they eamed from the game were also given to them as incentives. 
Apparatus 
Random Number Box (for output): a box containing 60 number plates ranging 
from -30 to 30 excluding zero for random number drawing. 
Candies: packets of candies were placed in the waiting room that could catch 
the sight from the participants 
Effort-Cost Tables: Two tables (C2500 and C5000) showing the conversion 
between effort and cost were prepared, (see Appendix B) 
Random Number Bag (for round uncertainty): a bag containing 70 paper 
marked 1 - 70 
Procedure 
Dynamic toumaments were played. Half of the participants played even 
games while the other half played uneven games. The experimental procedure was 
similar to study one except that the total number of rounds in the experiment was 
unknown. Participants would be given some time to examine the probability of game-
ending (see Appendix C) before the game began. After the dynamic experimental 
procedure described in study one was done, participants took tum to draw a number 
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from the random number bag (for round uncertainty) after each round. When the 
target number(s) was/were drawn (see Appendix C), the game would end immediately 
otherwise the game went on to the following round. When the game ended, for each 
pair ofparticipants, the one with higher accumulated output level received [18 minus 
accumulated cost of effort] while the other received [10 minus accumulated cost of 
effort]. The procedures for even game and uneven game were the same. 
Results 
Effort levels and costs 
For even toumament, a total of 158 observations were obtained. The average 
effort level was 53.8. The mean cost per round spent by the participants was 1.35 (SD = 
0.98). The average accumulated cost was 13.5 . The average number of rounds played 
was 8.78 (SD = 2.2) while the average participants' round expectation was 6.83 (SD 二 
3.14) rounds. 
For uneven toumament, a total of 188 observations were obtained. Half of 
them came from advantaged contestants while the remaining half from the 
disadvantaged. From the 188 observations, the mean effort level was 57.3 . The mean 
effort level supplied by the advantaged contestants was 59.4 while the mean effort 
level for the disadvantaged was 55.1 . The mean cost spent by all contestants in the 
uneven toumament was 1.10 per round (SD = 0.84). The mean cost spent by the 
advantaged was 0.842 per round with SD = 0.591 while for the disadvantaged it was 
1.365 (SD = 0.966). Pooling the data for even and uneven game, the correlation between 
the expected round and the observed effort was significant (p < 0.05) with r = -0.4 . 
Models' Performances 
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The mean effort predictions for the MTM, CMTM, RTM, CMGR and MCGR 
were 27.4，12.4, 53.5, 56.5, and 55.9 respectively for even games in our experiments 
(Table 13). For the advantaged [disadvantaged] in the uneven games, the mean effort 
levels were 23.0 [11.5]，9.55 [4.06], 52.6 [57.5], 73.1 [46.5], and 72.8 [47.4] respectively (Table 
14). 
The MSE in even games for MTM, CMTM, RTM, CMGR, and MCGR were 
1133.0,2187.2，720.5,437.0, and 690.3 respectively (Table 13). For the uneven games, the 
figures became 2150.5,3115.0,1138.9, 734.7, and 912.2 respectively (Table 14). Table 14 
also separately presents the MSE for the advantaged and the disadvantaged. 
For even games, the MAE for MTM, CMTM, RTM, CMGR, and MCGR are 
equal to 28.1,41.6,20.0,17.4，and 21.4 respectively (Table 13). For uneven games, the 
MAE were 40.9,50.6,27.0,21.3, and 23.5 respectively (Table 14). The summary of the 
models' performance for the advantaged and disadvantaged could be found in Table 
14. 
Comparisons 
For even toumament, ANOVA was performed on the effort predictions for the 
five models and the observed effort levels. The main effect was significant (F5 j85 = 
244.00, p < 0.01). To examine whether the predictions from the models were different 
from the observed effort levels, post-hoc comparisons (Scheffe) were done. The 
comparisons between RTM and the two Competition models showed non-significant 
results. It indicates that the two Competition models and the Rabbit Tortoise Model 
were able to predict effort decision in even tournaments. 
The MSE for even tournaments were tested across the five models. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the five models with the MSE as the 
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dependent variable. The differences in MSE across models were significant (F4 628 二 
63.365, p < 0.01) . Scheffe tests were performed. The results were shown in Table 15a. 
An examination of the results revealed that the MSE for CMTM > MTM > RTM = MCGR 
=CMGR. 
Another repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the five models with 
the MAE as the dependent variable. The differences in MAE between different 
models were significant (F4 628 = 61.97, p < 0.00). Scheffe tests were performed and the 
results were shown in Table 15b. Insignificant comparison was found between the 
two Competition models and the RTM. Overall speaking, MAE for CMTM > MTM > 
RTM = MCGR = CMGR. 
For uneven tournaments, an (Evenness ( 2 ) x Model ( 5 ) ) ANOVA was 
performed on the effort predictions for the five models and the observed effort levels. 
The main effect of Evenness was significant (Fi jg^ = 80.10, p < 0.01). It indicates that 
difference efforts were supplied by the advantaged and disadvantaged contestants. 
The main effect for Model was significant (F5 930 = 420.79, p < 0.01). To examine 
whether the predictions from the models were different from the observed effort 
levels, post-hoc comparisons (Scheffe) were done. The RTM and the two Competition 
models showed insignificant difference between their predictions and the observed 
effort levels. Hence, it might suggest that all the three models could predict the 
observed effort levels. 
The MSE for uneven toumament were tested across the five models. An 
ANOVA was performed on the five models with the MSE as the dependent variable, 
Model (5 levels) as within subject variable and Evenness (Advantaged versus 
Disadvantaged) as between subject variable. There was no main effect for Evenness 
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(Fi,i86 = 0.00138, p > 0.05) and interaction effect (F4 744 = 1.74, p > 0.05). Hence, the 
MSE were not different for the advantaged and the disadvantaged effort predictions 
across models. The differences in MSE across models were significant (F4 744 = 85.58, 
p < 0.01). Scheffe tests were performed. The results were shown in Table 16a. 
Overall, the MSE for CMTM > MTM > RTM = MCGR = CMGR. 
For the uneven toumament, an ANOVA (Evenness and Model (within subject) 
as independent variables) were performed on the five models with MAE as the 
dependent variable. The main effect for Evenness was not significant (Fi i86 二 0.01234, 
p > 0.05) while the interaction effect was significant (F4 744 = 3.84, p < 0.05). The 
differences in MAE across models were significant (F4 74g = 93.769, p < 0.00). Scheffe 
tests were performed. (Table 16b). Overall, MAE for the CMTM > MTM > RTM = MCGR 
=CMGR. 
Discussion 
The negative relation between expected rounds and effort levels is consistent 
with our assumption in building the dynamic models under certainty. In the models, 
the expected reward size is negatively related to the total number of round since more 
rounds implied more work and competition. Hence, when more rounds of games are 
expected, less effort would be supplied in each round subjected to unchanged rewards. 
It indicates the importance for assessing the 'subjective judgment' in order to model 
human behaviors. Many models in social sciences treat human cognitive ability as 
‘black box, and ignore it in modeling. The results of the present study call for a 
careful examination ofhow humans make their decisions, and of the individual 
differences in modeling human and social behaviors. Yet, all the models in the 
present studies do not incorporate the complication concerning how the participants 
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behave when the actual lengths of games extend beyond their expectation. Further 
investigations are required 
As shown in Table 15 and Table 16, the two Competition models and the 
Rabbit-Tortoise Model seemed to perform better than the two Multiple Tournaments 
models. The two Competition models and the Rabbit-Tortoise Model have smaller 
MSE and MAE. This is true for both even and uneven tournaments. Besides, the 
mean effort level predictions for the two Competition models as well as the Rabbit 
Tortoise Model were almost identical to the observed effort levels. As in study one, 
the two Competition Models are also able to explain dynamic toumament. Yet, it was 
surprising that the Rabbit Tortoise Model could perform as well as the two 
Competition models. The results might indicate that the Rabbit Tortoise Model 
performed better in the situation where the decision making was more complex. One 
possible explanation may be that in study three, the participants had to make effort 
decision with the length of game uncertain. The Rabbit Tortoise Model assumed that 
people could not maximize two goals simultaneously and could only focus on one 
goal. And this gave rise to the ‘rabbit-tortoise, effect. In fact, the decision making 
requirement in study one may still be within the human capacity. Most of the 
participants could consider cost and effort together in study one. As a result, only the 
Competition models provided accurate predictions but not the Rabbit Tortoise Model. 
However, in the uncertain situation, which involved more complex decisions, some of 
the participants might not be able to pursue the goal of maximizing winning chance 
and minimizing cost together and as a result followed the predictions of the Rabbit 
Tortoise Model. Hence, the predictability of the model improved. If this is really the 
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case, it would be interesting to examine whether more complex situations would make 
the Rabbit Tortoise Model the best model. 
In the present study, both the Multiple Tournaments Model and the 
Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model could not give us accurate predictions on 
effort levels. The reasons were discussed in study one already, which were related to 
the dynamic nature of the tournaments. 
The results suggest that, in planning the promotion and performance 
toumament schemes, we have to make a rough estimation of the complexity of the 
decision tasks for the workers. If it is just a length-certain dynamic toumament, then 
we have a good reason to expect that the toumament would induce higher output 
level. Yet, if the schemes are more complex (e.g., as in our experiment, the lengths of 
the games is uncertain), then we may have to take into account the implications of the 
Rabbit Tortoise Model since at least some of the employees may apply the 
approximation technique described by the model. From the Rabbit Tortoise Model, 
we expect the overall work effort will be smaller ifone of the contestants drops out 
(because the other contestant would always lead in the game and the goal to cut the 
cost become mores salient). Likewise, for the tournaments which contain at least one 
high-achiever, the overall output level would be exceptionally high (The high achiever 
would try to win the game by supplying more effort and the other contestant would 
more likely to fall suit with the goal to maximize winning chance made salient. 
Hence, the nature and personality ofthe employees would be the determinants on the 
successfulness of the toumament in motivating people. 
General Discussion 
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In our study, we aimed at extending the toumament model to account for a 
dynamic situation. The reason is that the tradition model, although confirmed in 
experimental studies, may not be able to generalize to real world applications — in 
particular, to promotion contestants. Results obtained from our Study two showed 
that with different assumptions on the nature of game (static vs. dynamic), the 
observed effort supplied by the contestants would be different. The effort supplied in 
dynamic toumament was found to be higher than that in static toumament. It indictes 
that our suspicion is correct. The conclusion also gains support from evidences on 
model comparisons in the dynamic tournament. 
Dynamic versus Static Tournaments 
In dynamic toumament, the Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum gave 
us precise prediction on effort levels despite it was a point prediction model. Some 
people may not agree to call a point prediction model as a dynamic model. Our reply 
is that: the assumption of the model conceptually captures the essence of dynamic 
situation which the toumament model does not. Feedback in a static toumament plays 
a substantially less important role than its role in a dynamic toumament. As discussed 
in study two, for static toumament, each game is independent of one another, and as a 
result, the feedback, no matter positive or negative, has less impact on decision 
makings. In this case, marginal maximization, which is assumed by toumament 
model, provides us with acceptable predictions. In dynamic situations, feedback 
carries implications. Take a remote but everyday example: when buying an item in a 
‘closed，auction, the bid is not disclosed publicly. One would calculate one's own 
marginal benefit and cost to make a bid which enables one to optimize the gain. This 
situation is analogue to a static game. Yet, open competitions are allowed in a public 
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auction. When one's opponent makes a slightly higher bid, one may be willing to 
eam a little less than the optimal level dictated by the marginal maximization and 
offers a higher price. The process goes on and the gain from winning the item would 
be reduced. Eventually, the final bid for the item is much higher in a public auction 
than a closed one. Hence, feedback (open bid) by others would affect our behaviors. 
This open bid resembles our dynamic story. Our dynamic game participants were 
affected by the output-feedback of their opponents: they supply higher effort than they 
would do in a static game even though the reward size is not changed. 
From study one and study three, we found that the Competition Model with 
Guaranteed Retum has the lowest mean squared errors and mean absolute errors but 
not the Multiple Toumaments Models. This may be related to their underlying 
assumptions. The two Competition models with Guaranteed Retum assume both 
competition and continuous feedback while the toumament models, despite their 
interactive nature, overlook the importance of feedback. In our studies all the models 
are deductive and as a result, different predictions offered by them might be attributed 
to the unique assumptions they employed. The superiority of the Competition models 
may demonstrate the applicability of their assumptions in dynamic process. In order 
words, the assumption of competition may reflect the nature and criteria of dynamic 
decision making. It also implies that our initial assertion that dynamic and static 
toumaments are different and that applying static toumament to explain promotion is 
a misapplication may be true. 
From the foregoing account, the results in our studies imply that applying the 
static (Lazear-Rosen) toumament model to estimate real world situations might obtain 
unwarranted results due to the invalidity ofassumptions. Although some may argue 
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that unrealistic assumptions may still lead to accurate prediction. Borrowing Cheung 
(1980, 1990)'s discussion of assumptions and constraints, we cannot ‘assume，a dirty 
test-tube as ‘dean’ in an experiment where cleanliness is a required testing condition. 
Likewise, we cannot assume the real world toumament (especially for promotions and 
performance contests) as static toumament and apply the Lazear-Rosen model. 
Alternatively, we have to employ the ‘dynamic toumament models' which take into 
account dynamic elements. 
Models and Efforts 
Despite the present collection of dynamic toumament models in modeling 
promotion toumament, it is by no means complete nor exhaustive. However, those 
models could still act as derives to estimate effort for promotion and performance 
tournaments before any other still-to-be-discovered model emerges. As for the static 
toumament model, dynamic toumament models (Multiple Tournaments Model and 
Rabbit Tortoise Model) aim at helping the organization decision makers to preview 
the incentive effect of their payment and promotion compensation plans before any 
irreversible action is taken. 
Another implication for the organization from the present studies is to assure 
them of the extra-ordinary incentive effect provided by the tournaments over some 
other payment schemes (e.g., piece rate). Since the static toumament model is said to 
have comparable incentive effect to the piece rate (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Bull et al., 
1987), the extra effort inducement of dynamic toumament over static toumament may 
suggest that it can induce more work effort than piece rate schemes. Of course further 
research has to be pursue in this direction to assess the deduction. If this is supported, 
we could theoretically support the empirical findings from Parker (1982) that contests 
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are effective in motivating people. As discussed in study two, a precaution should be 
taken against the overuse of toumament to induce work effort since the 'marginal 
benefit’ ofusing it might be subjected to fall when more and more tournaments are 
introduced due to desensitization. Other considerations like stress of employees 
should be taken into account as well. Research showed that stress and performances 
have an inverted t/-shaped relationship, where too much stress could have adverse 
effects (Motowidlo, Packard & Manning, 1986). The exact relation between dynamic 
toumament and stress would have to be examined in future studies before the 'optimal 
level’ of toumament could be determined. 
Rationality and Complexity 
Although the Rabbit Tortoise Model is never the best model in our studies, it 
yields interesting implications. The model is special when compared to the Multiple 
Tournaments Models and Competition models. Its assumptions are that human beings 
have limited processing capacity and when the system 'overloads,' only some 
prominent features would be considered and be relevant to the decision making 
processes. This is demonstrated by the single-mindedness (Gardiner & Edwards, 
1975) and the prominence effects (Tversky, et al. 1988). However, we only know that 
we have these effects but we can not concretely predict when these effects appear. 
May be more complex tasks would have a higher probability to induce people to give 
up making normative and rational choices and tum into using approximations. If the 
argument holds, in complex tasks the assumptions of the Rabbit Tortoise Model 
would be appropriate and it follows that the Rabbit Tortoise Model would perform 
better in complex than in simple decisions. Our findings indirectly support these. It 
performed better in uneven game than in even game in study one while it also 
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performed better in study three than in study one where the decision making involved 
uncertainty. However, we should have an operationalized measurement of the 
‘complexity’ oftask before any conclusive claim could be made. At present, by 
borrowing Leibenstein (1980),s argument on mental 'calculatedness', we assume that 
the task involving more steps in calculation are more complex. However, further 
examinations on the task-model interaction may have to be pursued. In order words, 
studies with varying task difficulties may be used to test the Rabbit Tortoise Model in 
order to see if it performs better in more complex tournaments. If the speculation is 
correct, then we expect there exists a point where the Rabbit Tortoise Model out-
performs all other rational models including the Competition models. This 
phenomenon may reflect a process of ‘irrationalization,’ which may be a function of 
mental 'calculatedness,' or mental cost. This may be an interesting research direction 
for decision making and problem solving scientists. 
Beyond Normal Promotion Tournaments 
Sometime a firm may hire people from outside (Rees 1992). We expect that if 
the outside competitor is unexpected, then no impact on the work effort decision 
should be observed and in this case our models' predictions may be acceptable. If a 
competitor is 'partially expected' (e.g., by past record of the companies), the model 
might have to take subjective probability into account. The contestants may equate 
their marginal cost (the cost of an additional unit of effort) and marginal benefit (the 
increase in the subjective probability of winning given an additional effort times the 
winning reward). The expectation ofan additional competitor would normally be 
assumed to reduce the subjective probability of winning in all effort levels whenever 
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she is partially expected or fully anticipated. This may be a direction for extending 
toumament models. 
Moreover, some people argue that not all performance contests in a firm use 
higher positions as retums to the contestants. For instance, some contests arejust 
special campaigns to provide more than normal incentives (Wildt, Parker, & Harris, 
1980) to direct to specific goals like quota (Johnson, 1976; Scotton, 1961 as cited in 
Parker 1982). Bonus, merchandise, and travel are often offered to the better 
performers as awards instead ofhigher hierarchical positions (Parker, 1982). Yet, 
according to Johnson (1976), contestants in this kind of performance contests may (1) 
compete with themselves based on quota performance or (2) compete with one 
another, or (3) be organized into groups and awards are given on a group basis. In the 
second and the third cases, contestants are ranked in term of their performance and the 
prizes are awarded in a descending order (Johnson, 1976). As a result, at least some of 
the performance contests could satisfy the criteria ofbeing a toumament by having (1) 
more than one prize level, (2) rank-ordered based reward distribution systems. In 
contrast to promotion, no study seems to have explored the applicability of 
toumament models in performance contests. It would be a potential field extension of 
the models. 
Another potental area for exploration is to extent the model to a multi-players 
situation. However, the extension to the traditional toumament model would be 
difficult since it involved more interactions between players. For the Rabbit Tortoise 
Model and Competition Models, it would seem to be relatively easy. Yet, the 
derivation and testing of those generalized models have to be study thoroughly before 
any conclusion could be made. 
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Since the two tournament models were consistently giving low effort 
predictions, it would also be interesting to see if any correction factor could be added 
to or multiply to the models' predictions based on empirical estimation. Those factors 
may be accounted by the desire for excel, social facilitation, etc.. 
Limitations and Research Recommendations 
Methodogically speaking, the present study employed non-monetary reward 
incentives. Despite our demonstration in our pilot study that the present experimental 
settings could replicate the past findings which employed monetary reward in the 
experiments (Bull et al., 1987; Weigelt et al. 1989; Dukerich, et al. 1990), 
generalizability to the real world has to be carefully validated in field studies. 
Besides, in study three, to reduce unnecessary deception, the number of rounds played 
in the game was not manipulated. Yet, this limits the total number of observations. 
And the comparisons of effort levels across rounds also became difficult. 
In the experiments, we faced the dilemma of whether to provide candies before 
the games to make the participants feel that they were really losing something in case 
of negative rewards. However, a small amount could not solve the problem of 
negative rewards while with a large amount, the 'utilities' obtained from the rewards 
in the tournaments could be reduced significantly (diminishing marginal utility) and 
the participants may not be motivated to play seriously. Yet, according to some of the 
preliminary experiments' participants, not losing real things might not matter a lot and 
they claimed people do not like to be bankrupted in playing Monopoly even if the 
money is fake. As a result, we expect that most people would not play to their own 
disadvantage and so we chose to provide rewards without prepayment after weighting 
the cost and benefit. 
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Statistically, ANOVAs were done to compare the differences between groups. 
The distribution of the MSE and MAE in the model is not a well-known variable 
which is proved to be normal. ANOVA was considered by some as robust in the 
violation of the normality assumption. People who are skeptical to the above notion 
are advised to restrict the comparison of model to descriptive level. Besides, for some 
ofthe comparisons between observed effort level and predicted effort level, the 
predicted effort level was a constant (competition model and multiple tournaments 
model). Hence, the observed effort levels were tested against a constant. However, 
with the violation of the homogeneity assumption, the applicability of the results in 
the post-hoc comparisons should be interpreted with care. All the post-hoc results are 
obtained through Statistica 4.5 (copyright held by StatSoft, Inc, 1993). 
Theoretically, due to the limitation of the knowledge on dynamic toumament, 
we could not decide the best suited assumptions and as a result we gave equal 
treatments to all the potential models employing different assumptions. Specific 
testing on the relationships between models and their assumptions as well as the tasks' 
(e.g., complexity) effects on models could not be adequately assessed. Further 
research may be recommended to focus on specific models' assumptions and 
implications as well as their performance-task interaction. 
The psychological impact of toumament is another overlooked yet important 
field that demands further investigations. How do tournaments affect the employees' 
psychological well beings and in tum their performance? In what way would 
tournaments affect the employees' commitment to the companies and how would the 
atmosphere of competition affect the employer-employee as well as the employee-
employee relations? Besides, how is the subjective judgment for length-uncertain 
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toumament estimated by individuals and what are the factors affecting it are also 
interesting and practical questions in which we can examine. We hope that the 
present paper serves as a preliminary step for exploring the issue of dynamic and 
uncertain toumaments and could stimulate development in future research. 
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Table 1. Summary of Average Efforts and Standard Derivations for Different Rounds 
(Pilot Studv AV 
Round “ ' l 2 ~3 4 5 6 7 8 9 73 77 7T" 
Effort 7 5 . 2 “ W A ^ " " 6 8 ^ ^ 6 8 . 2 65.4"“^W3^“^52^0"“^^""""52?!""""54.1 60 .2“60 .4 
(15.4) (15.9) (15.8) (24.1) (27.3) (17.2) (27.9) (25.3) (15.5) (13.4) (20.8) (21.7) 
Model ‘ “ 62.5 ‘““62.5 ‘“ “62.5 ‘"'62.5 “ “ “ 62.5 ‘一‘62.5 ‘““62.5 “"62.5 “  ‘ 62.5 ““ “62.5 ““ _62.5 “""62.5 “ 
note: numbers in parenthesis are SD 
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Table 2. Summary of Average Efforts and Standard Derivations for Different Rounds 
(Pilot Studv B \ 
No exact-output feedback 
Round 1 2 i 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Advantaged Effort^"^"^"8O0"""8o!o"""^86.7 76.7 81.7"""^ 83^3"""8L0"^ ^86^0""^ WT 
SD 5.0 26.4 10.0 7.6 20.8 10.4 10.4 8.5 5.3 5.5 
Disadvantaged Effort~~^~~75^~~^~~7^~~5^~~^~~73l~~TL?~~^~~70.0 
SD 11.5 31.2 5.8 7.6 30.4 5.0 2.9 10.4 12.6 5.0 
Exact-output feedback 
Round 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 ~ 
Advantaged Effort 70.0 80.0 75.0 78.3 79.3 76.7 71.7 82.0 81.7 68.3 
SD 10.0 17.3 5.0 7.6 9.0 11.5 12.6 6.2 12.6 10.4 
Disadvantaged Effort~~^~~^~~^~~80^~~^~~^~~^~~5^~~3^~~30.7 
SD 15.0 10.0 18.0 20.0 10.0 15.3 8.7 41.6 35.6 51.4 
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Table 3. ANOVA Results (Pilot Studv B \ 
Effect dfEffect”MSEffect“dfError“MSError F~~p-level 
Feedback 1 ^ ““ 1904.033 " “ “ “ 75^4"""" 2.52 0.015 
Evenness i 5964300 8 755.14 1.90 “…0.02* “‘“ 
Round 9 3 i9.348 72 ‘ ‘ ‘ 259.96 i "23 029 ‘‘‘ 
…“'Feedbackx i 202.800 8 755.14 021 0.62“_“• 
Evenness 
•-…Feedfack x 9 428.219 72 ‘‘ ‘ 259.96 i "65 0.12 “ “ “ • 
Round 
Evenness "x 9 464.596 72 ““‘ 259.96 i J8 0.09 ‘‘“ 
Round 
•-…"feedbackx 9 288.763 72"…“‘““259.96 i:i 1 0.37“‘“• 
Evenness x Round 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 level 
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Table 4. Summary of Model Predictions and Performance for even toumament 
(Studv One) 
Model~Observed~MTM CMTM KTM CMGR MCGR 
Mean 5ol T^ 8^66 ^H 44J 4M^“ 
Effort (23.6) (n.a.) (6.55) (26.8) (n.a.) (17.6) 
“““"Mean N.A."…““““1697" i 2256^ i0949 587.70 712.95"“““ 
MSE (1738.7) (2138.9) (1678.3) (770.3) (1032.6) 
‘““"Mean N.A"…“ 35.5 …“…“41.9 “…“‘“““26.0 19.7 --… 21.3 “ … 
MAE (21.0) (22.5) (20.5) (14.2) (16.2) 
note: The effort predictions for MTM and CMGR are a constant 
The Figures are not collapsed across rounds 
The values in parenthesis are SD 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Toumaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 5. Summary ofModel Predictions and Performance for uneven toumament 
(Studv One) 
Observed~MTM CMTM J f H CMGR MCGR 
Overall 48^ 6 ^ 2J 3 0 540 546 
(28.6) (4.2) (4.9) (32.9) (9.3) (19.3) 
Mean “““"Adv. 54"7 16.8 3.6 43.7 63.3 63.8…“ 
Effort (27.7) (n.a.) (6.1) (32.3) (n.a.) (18.5) 
Disadv. 42"6 8.41 L81 53.6 44.7 45.5 
(28.4) (n.a.) (3.03) (32.9) (n.a.) (15.3) 
Overall ^ 2077.9 3022.5 1629.4 816.4 1142.7^^ 
(2310.7) (2995.9) (2236.6) (898.7) (1407.1) 
Mean ‘‘“"Adv.“…‘“‘“N"A.…““““"219i:§ 3568；9 1381 '.1 833.2 il54j"‘‘“ 
MSE (2182.2) (3028.0) (2040.8) (895.9) (1426.8) 
“"Disadv. N'A. i 964；6 2476.1 i S77. \ 799.6 "l 131:1 “‘‘“ 
(2439.3) (2877.2) (2402.5) (906.3) (1395.2) 
Overall ~- 37.7 46.2 "““ 3^2 23^ 'Wo 
(25.7) (28.5) (24.5) (15.7) (20.4) 
Mean ‘‘‘‘"Adv.“…“““‘NA." 39.5 51.6 28.8 24.6…““‘“‘“27."l “ … 
MAE (25.3) (27.5) (23.7) (15.2) (20.6) 
-Di'sadv. NA.--… 35.9 40.8--… 35.5 23.3 26.9…“ 
(26.2) (28.6) (24.9) (16.2) (20.3) 
note: The values in parenthesis are SD 
The figures are not collapsed across rounds 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 6a. ANOVA Results for MSE (Studv One Even Toumament). 
Effect dfEffect~""MSEffect“dfError“MSError F~p-level 
“ Model 4 88295800 68 1777891 49^ 0.000" 
Round 9 766^76 153 6914795 1:11 0.360 ““ 
" ^ ^ - ^ i i K ^ a 36 ^38896 612 1157377 \.93…”0.b0i**" 
note ** — significant at 0.01 level 
Table 6b. ANOVA Results for MAE fStudv One Even Tournament). 
Effect dfEffect”MSEffect~~dfError“MSError F p-level 
Model 4 16324.78 68 422.35 38.65 0.000** 
Round 9 969"i4 153--…“‘‘“955.07 i:6_1 0.43l"““• 
‘““"ModeiX'Round 36 461M 612 187.52 2A6 ‘“‘0.066** “• 
note ** 一 significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 7a. Post-hoc comparisons(Scheffe) for MSE in even tournaments (Study One). 
Model “MTM \ CMTM \~RTM”i CMGR \ MCGR 
(MSE) 1697.133 \ 2256.507 \ 1094.922 \ 587.7018 \ 712.9482 
MTM ： = ： ~ ^ 1 ^ 
"CMTM -“ ： ： : : 
'""RTM -“ :"…** : : : 
""CMGR -“- :"…** : "*" : : 
"MCGR ** ：-----** : : : 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** —significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Tournaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
Table 7b. Post-hoc (Scheffe) comparisons for MAE in even toumaments (Study 
One). 
Model MTM \ CMTM \~~RTM”： CMGR \ MCGR 
(MAE) 35.485 j 41.865 \ 26.044 \ 19.695 | 21.256 
MTM \ \ ^^^‘^^^^^^1 ^ ^^‘~^^^^^i~= 
""CMTM ： j ： ： 
'""RTM -“- i…“** i ： ： 
""CMGR **……：-----**------i i i 
"MCGR -“……i…“**……i i i 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** —significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Toumaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 8a. ANOVA Results for MSE (Study One Uneven Tournament). 
Effect dfEffect“MSEffect“dfError~MSError F~p-level 
Evenness ‘"^^1 4763271 16 35796500 ^ 0.720 
Model 4 i ^ 4 ^ o o d 64 - - - - - “ • _ i ' i 2 8 6 i 6 o “ ‘ “ • i T . Y i _ “ _ o . b o 6 * * “ • 
Round 9 1 0 4 8 2 6 0 0 1 4 4 7 ^ 4 2 0 5 1 " 4 5 “ … 0 " l 7 3 ‘ ‘ . 
Evenness x Model 4 1 2 0 7 6 ^ 0 64--…“““i"l286T00 i ' 6 l … “ 0 . 3 7 9 “ “ • 
• Evennessx Round 9 64i99l"8 144 7244205 o"89 …“0.539 ‘• 
““"ModeiX 'Round 36 2749325 576 2i35746 129 …“0j'25 ‘ ‘• 
• Evennessx Model 36 154^40 576 2135746 0.73 0.882 ““ 
X Round 
note ** — significant at 0.01 level 
Table 8b. ANOVA Results for MAE (Studv One Uneven Toumament). 
Effect dfEffect~~MSEffect~~dfError~MSError F p-level 
Evenness 1 746.50 ~ 3766.88 020 0.662 
Model 4 i4190.15 64…“““““i692'76 8*38 ‘“‘0.b06** ““ 
Round 9 "1278.49 144 749.19 \.1\ 0.092 ‘‘• 
“"Evennessx Model 4 1 8 0 3 . 3 9 6 4 - … - “ ‘ “ ‘ 1 6 9 2 ； 7 6 i ： 0 7 … - 0 . 3 8 l " “ “ _ 
• "Evenness"x Round 9 555：85 144 '749A9 0J4 …-'o'.eio ‘‘ 
‘‘‘"Modei X 'Round 36 42139 576 287.60 \A1 …“6；642*"" • 
“"Evennessx'Modei 36 202：32 576 287.60 6：70 -—_ 0.903 “-
X Round 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 level 
** — significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 9a. Post-hoc (Scheffe) comparisons for MSE in uneven tournaments for all 
participants (Studv One� . 
Model “MTM \ CMTM \~RTM”： CMGR \ MCGR 
(MSE) 2077.916 丨 2945.257 丨 1629.433 丨 816.435 丨 1142.686 
MTM ! ! ! ! 
""CMTM : : : : 
'""RTM ：…"** j : : 
""CMGR * i…“** i ： i 
"MCGR :-----** : : : 
note * — significant at 0.05 
** —significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Tournaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
Table 9b. Post-hoc comparisons (Scheffe) for MAE in uneven tournaments for all 
participants (Study One) 
Model “MTM \ CMTM \~~RTM“： CMGR \ MCGR 
(MAE) 37.688 \ 46.236 \ 32.167 \ 23.918 j 27.015 
"^^^MTM ： i i ^ P' ^ 
""cmM ： i ： ： 
'""RTM ：……*……i ： ： 
""CMGR * i…“**……i ； ： 
"MCGR i…“**……I i ： 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** —significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 10. Summary statistics for the observed effort levels and models predictions 
(Study Two). 
Model Observed TM RTM CMGR MCGR 
~Mean ^ T^ ^ 44J ^5J 
Effort (22.7) (n.a.) (29.0) (n.a.) (19.7) 
~~Mean N X 888.2 915.4 587.7 1293.7~~~ 
MSE (980.0) (1322.3) (728.7) (1675.9) 
~~Mean N^ ^5 ^ ^92 2^ 
MAE (15.4) (18.6) (14.9) (21.0) 
note: The effort predictions for MTM and CMGR are a constant 
The figures are not collapsed across rounds 
The values in parenthesis are SD 
TM: Lazear-Rosen Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table l la . ANOVA Results for MSE (Studv Two). 
Effect dfEffect“MSEffect“dfError“MSError F~"p-level 
Model 3 13032900 Tl 3431396 3M 0.016* 
Round 9 1303873 153 1678805 0.lS "…0.638 “““ 
Model X Round 27 ^57907 459 77i280 3"06 ‘““ 0.066** “• 
note * — significant at 0.05 level 
** — significant at 0.01 level 
Table 1 lb. ANOVA Results for MAE fStudv Two). 
Effect dfEffect“MSEffect~"dfError“MSError F p-level 
Model ~ 2979.60 T\ 1009.55 2^51 0.041* 
Roimd -"9 365'50 153 339.91 i!08 ' " ^ 0.384 ‘‘• 
‘‘‘"ModeiX Round 27 594'85 459 172.19 S"45…-O.Od6** ‘• 
note * — significant at 0.05 level 
** —significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 12a. Post-hoc Comparisons for MSE TStudv Two). 
Model ~m“I“RTM“： CMGR \ MCGR 
(MSE) 852.670 丨 757.W7 丨 637.872 丨 1258.100 
^""“^TM ! ! 1 
""RfM : : : 
""CMGR ： : : 
"MCGR ： ： *• ： 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** 一significant at 0.01 
TM: Lazear-Rosen Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
Table 12b. Post-hoc Comparisons for MAE (Studv Two). 
Model TM~~|~~RTM“j CMGR \ MCGR 
(MAE) 24.670 \ 21.528 j 20.278 \ 29.408 
" ^ T M 1 1 1 
'""RTM ： I i 
""CMGR ： ： ； 
"MCGR ： i……-*-……i 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** 一significant at 0.01 
TM: Lazear-Rosen Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 13. Summary of Model Predictions and Performance for even toumament 
(Study Three). 
Model Observed MTM CMTM RTM CMGR MCGR 
~Mean 53l 274 ^24 53^ 56.50 55.9 
Effort (22.6) (10.0) (12.9) (28.7) (9.8) (19.1) 
~~Mean N ^ 1133.0 2187.2 7 ^ 4 ^ 6 ^ ~ ~ 
MSE (1269.4) (1966.9) (1105.4) (575.4) (886.0) 
~~Mean N ^ ^ 4L6 ^ VJA n A 
MAE (18.6) (21.4) (17.9) (11.5) (15.2) 
note: The values in parenthesis are SD 
The figures are not collapsed across rounds 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Toumaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 14. Summary ofModel Predictions and Performances for uneven tournament 
(Studv Three) 
Observed~""MTM CMTM RTM CMGR MCGR 
Overall 573 n 3 0 1 55J 59.8 6 o T ^ 
(22.5) (7.5) (8.32) (27.7) (15.4) (22.3) 
Mean ‘“• "Adv.…“‘“‘“594 23.0 9.55 52.6…- 73"j" 72.8…“ 
Effort (23.6) (6.15) (10.3) (26.5) (9.60) (19.0) 
Disadv. 55"i Vl.5 4.06 …“ 57.5 …“ 46.5 47.4 "… 
(21.2) (3.08) (4.32) (28.9) (5.51) (17.5) 
Overall S T ~ “2150.5 3115.0 1138.9 T ^ J ‘"^ “912.2 
(2036.6) (2558.1) (1616.6) (985.0) (1332.8) 
Mean ‘‘“"A'dv.-…‘‘““N'A." 1954"7 31562 i052J 89l"2 lOlZS"“‘_ 
MSE (2017.7) (2726.6) (1545.7) (1026.7) (1392.2) 
“-"Disadv. NA".…““‘“'^463 涵 : § 12253 5^8.!“…““““8il".5 “““‘ 
(2047.2) (2391.8) (1688.4) (854.7) (1270.1) 
Overall S T 40.9 50^ 27.0 " H l 23^ 
(21.9) (23.6) (20.3) (16.8) (19.0) 
Mean ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ "Adv. NA.--… 37.9 50.'l 25.7 24.8 …““““““25.2 …“ 
MAE (22.9) (25.5) (19.8) (16.7) (19.5) 
‘“'bisadv'‘‘…-N"A.―… 43.9 51.T…““‘“‘“28.2…“-…"l7.8 21.8“… 
(20.5) (21.7) (20.9) (16.3) (18.4) 
note: The values in parenthesis are SD 
The figures are not collapsed across rounds 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Toumaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 15a. Post-hoc (Scheffe) comparisons for MSE in even tournaments (Study 
Three). 
Model MTM \ CMTM \“WM“： CMGR \ MCGR 
(MSE) 1133.042 丨 2m.2VJ \ 720.4810 丨 436.9527 丨 690.3250 
MTM 1 1 ! p^ 
"CMTM ** 1 : : : 
RTM "** ; ** ： ； ： 
"CMGR ** I"…**……： j ： 
""MCGR * :…“**……: : : 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** 一significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Tournaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
Table 15b. Post-hoc (Scheffe) comparisons for MAE in even tournaments (Study 
Three). 
Model “MTM \ CMTM \~~RTM“i CMGR \ MCGR 
(MAE) 28.08092 ； 41.59810 \ 20.01266 ； 17.44735 ； 21.44355 
MTM I ： ^ r ^ ^ 
""CMTM ** i ： i ： 
"""RTM ** ："…** i ： I 
'"'CMGR -“ :"…** : : : 
"MCGR -“ ：-----** ： : I 
note * — significant at 0.05 
** 一significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Tournaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Toumaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Table 16a. Post-hoc (Scheffe) comparisons for MSE in uneven toumaments for all 
participants (Studv Three). 
Model “MTM \ CMTM \~RTM“： CMGR ： MCGR 
(MSE) 2150.506 丨 3114.977 丨 1138.926 丨 n4.6522 \ 912.1566 
MTM 1 1 1 ! 
"CMTM -“ ： ： : : 
""AfM ** ：…“**……i ： ： 
"CMGR ** ：…“**……i ： ： 
""MCGR -“ ：-----** : : : 
‘ ‘ ’ ‘ 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** 一significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Toumaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Return 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
Table 16b. Post-hoc comparisons (Scheffe) for MAE in uneven toumaments for all 
participants (Study Three). 
Model “MTM \ CMTM \“RTM“i CMGR \ MCGR 
(MAE) 40.91851 丨 50.61255 丨 26.96808 丨 21.30579 丨 23.50937 
MTM “ 1 I^^"^^= 7 ~ 1 
""CMTM ** j ： i ： 
'""RTM ** i“…** ： ： ： 
""CMGR -*-*- ：--…** : : : 
"MCGR ** ：------“ ： : : 
note * 一 significant at 0.05 
** 一significant at 0.01 
MTM: Multiple Toumaments Model 
CMTM: Cumulative Multiple Tournaments Model 
RTM: Rabbit Tortoise Model 
CMGR: Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
MCGR: Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1 • Plot ofRound's Effect on Effort Level (Pilot Experiment A) 
Figure 2. The interaction Between Round and Evenness (Pilot Experiment B) 
Figure 3. Efforts vs. Models' Predictions (Even) 
Figure 4. Efforts for the Advantaged vs. Models' Predictions (Uneven) 
Figure 5. Effort for the Disadvantaged vs. Models' Predictions (Uneven) 
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Appendix A 
Effort Predictions 
Multiple Toumaments Model 
In Study one, we had ten rounds in each toumament. For even game, the 





In our experiment, M (winner prize) = 18 and m (loser prize) = 10; c = 2500 (c is 
a constant determining the cost-effort conversion where cost =咖"）.b = 30 {b is the 
c 
range of random number). From the formula, effort level predicted from the model 




e 二 4ba 
j M-m 
1 + ( ¾ ^ ^ ) 
4b2 2b 
e/=aej 
where the c for Cj = 2500. Given the setting of our parameter, the predictions from the 
model become j^ = 8.411 and e； 二 16.822 . 
In Study three, the total round of game 10 ——was substituted by the expected 
total round of game wrote by the participants. Hence, for even toumament, 
, M - m � 
e = ^ 
4b 
where / is the number of round expected by the participant; while for uneven 
toumament, it became 
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,M—m� 。 ( 7 ) 
^ - 2a 
“ ,M—m� 





e,=a 2 ^ " ^ 
‘ ,M—m� 
l - a � ( ^ : ^ ) 
l + [ M ^ ] [ — — - ^ ] 
4b^ 2b 
where c； = 5000 and cj = 2500 and r = number of round expected by the participant. 
Cumulative Multiple Toumaments Model 
The Cumulative multiple toumaments model was similar to the Multiple 
toumaments model in that the whole toumament was divided into smaller independent 
toumament. Yet, this model also took into account the residual effect ——the 
differences between the accumulated output levels — left over from the last round. In 
our experiment, M (winner prize) = 18 and m (loser prize) = 10; c = 2500 (c is a constant 
determining the cost-effort conversion where cos/ 二 咖"）• b = 30 {b is the range of 
c 
random number For even toumament in Study one, effort predictions of the two 
contestants are the same: 
-1 k 1 c{M-m) 
e； =e： = 7" X 
1 J l2b 4b^ 」 2 
For uneven toumament, the model becomes: 
M-m 
[ 去 - ^ ^ ] [ 字 ] 
=^b Ab 2g 
j M - m 
1 + ¾ ^ " + 
e, = aej 
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where k was the differences between the accumulated output levels and a equal 2 in 
our experiment according to the different in cost-effort function (see C2500 and 
C5000 tables below). 
For Study three, the total rounds were the expected total rounds indicated by 
the participants. Hence，for even toumament, the predictions became 
,M-m^ 
� 1 k 1 c ( 7 ) 
e. = e • = X 
1 J l2b 4^2� 2 
where / is the number of round expected by the participant; while for uneven 
toumament, the predictions became 
,M-m, 1 k Cj(^:7") [ ^ - ^ ] [ ^ ^ ] 
_ 2b 4b 2g 
ej .M-m. 
1 - a c y ( ^ ^ ) 
l + [ ^ ] [ — — - ~ ~ ] 
Ab^ 2b J 
,M-m^ 
1 k c'(^^) 
d ^ i r r ^ 1 
^2b 462Jl 2a J 
e'=a ,M-m� 
l + [ ^ a 
Ab^ 2b J 
where the cj = 2500 and Ci = 5000 
Rabbit Tortoise Model 
The effort prediction for each round was equal to the effort level of last round 
plus (for those with lower accumulated output level) or minus (for those with higher 
accumulated output level) the different between accumulated output level. The effort 
level for the first round was assumed 50 which was the mid-point of the range of effort 
level available for choosing. If predicted effort is larger than 100, then it would be set 
to 100. If the predicted effort is negative, it would be set to zero. 
Round One: 50 
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Round t: effort level “1 土 difference of accumulated output levels between players 
Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
In Study one, effort prediction for even toumament was 
18 — 8 
effort = , X 2500 
V 10 
and it was equaled to 44.72，while the predictions for uneven toumament were 
/l8 — 8 
The Advantaged: effort = y ^^  x 5000 
/l8 — 8 
The Disadvantaged: effort - y ^^  x 2500 
Numerically, the effort for the advantaged was 63.25 and the effort prediction for the 
disadvantaged was 44.72. 
In Study three the total round ‘10’ was substituted by the expected round of the 
participant. For even toumament, it became 
10 _ 0 
effort = � x2500 
V r^  
For the uneven toumament, it became 
18 — 8 
The Advantaged: effort = x 5000 
V r' 
/l8 — 8 
The Disadvantaged: effort = x 2500 
V r' 
Moving Competition Model with Guaranteed Retum 
In Study one, effort prediction for even toumament was 
18 — 8 
effor�= y ~ j ^ - X 2500 - random shock in period .^i 
and it was equaled to 44.72, while the predictions for uneven toumament were 
18 — 8 
The Advantaged: effor�= ^ ^^  x 5000 - random shock in periodt-i 
Dynamic Tournament P. 101 
/l8 — 8 
The Disadvantaged: effort, = J ^^  x 2500 - random shock in period t] 
In Study three the total round ‘ 10，was substituted by the expected round of the 
participant. For even toumament, it became 
/ l 8 - 8 
effortf = X 2500 - random shock in period j j 
V r® 
For the uneven toumament, it became 
ll8- 8 
The Advantaged: effort, = . x 5000 - random shock in period., 
V r® 
/l8 — 8 
The Disadvantaged: effort, = x 2500 - random shock in period ^  j 
V r® 
For the model, any negative predicted effort level would be set to zero and any higher-
than-100 effort level would be set to its maximum——100. 
對照表C5000
勞力 成本 勞力 成本 勞力 成本 勞力 成本
0.0002 26 0.1352 51 0.5202 76 1.1552 
2 0.0008 27 0.1458 52 0.5408 77 1.1858 
3 0.0018 28 0.1 568 53 0.5618 78 1.21681 
4 0.0032 29 0.1682 54 0.5832 79 1.2482 
5 0.005 30 0.1 8 55 0.605 80 1.28 
6 0.0072 31 0.1 922 56 0.6272 81 1.3122 
7 0.0098 32 0.2048 57 0.6498 82 1.3448 
r 8 0.0128 33 0.2178 58 0.6728 83 1.3778 
9 0.0162 34 0.2312 59 0.6962 84 1.4112 
10 0.02 35 0.245 60 0.72 85 1.445 
11 0.0242 36 0.2592 61 0.7442 86 1.4792 
12 0.0288 37 0.2738 62 0.7688 87 1.5138 
13 0.0338 38 0.2888 63 0.7938 88 1.5488 
14 0.0392 39 0.3042 64 0.8192 89 1.5842 
15 0.045 40 0.32 65 0.845 90 1.62 
16 0.0512 41 0.3362 66 0.8712 91 1.6562 
17 0.0578 42 0.3528 67 0.8978 92 1.6928 
18 0.0648 43 0.3698 68 0.9248 93 1.7298 
19 0.0722 44 0.3872 69 0.9522 94 1.7672 
20 0.08 45 0.405 70 0.98 95 1.805 
21 0.0882 46 0.4232 71 1.0082 96 1.8432 
22 0.0968 47 0.4418 72 1.0368 97 1.8818 
23 0.1 058 48 0.4608 73 1.0658 98 1.9208 
24 0.1 152 49 0.4802 74 1.0952 99 1.9602 











































0.1 024 41 
0.1 1561 42 
0.1296 43 
0.1444 44 
0.1 6 45 






成本 勞力 成本 勞力 成本
0.2704 51 1.0404 76 2.3104 
0.2916 52 1.0816 77 2.3716 
0.3136 53 1.1236 78 2.4336 
0.3364 54 1.1664 79 2.4964 
0.36 55 1.21 80 2.56 
0.3844 56 1.2544 81 2.6244 
0.4096 57 1.2996 82 2.6896 
0.4356 58 1.3456 83 2.7556 
0.4624 59 1.3924 84 2.8224 
0.49 60 1.44 85 2.89 
0.5184 61 1.4884 86 2.9584 
0.5476 62 1.5376 87 3.0276 
0.5776 63 1.5876 88 3.0976 
0.6084 64 1.6384 89 3.1684 
0.64 65 1.69 90 3.24 
0.6724 66 1.7424 91 3.3124 
0.7056 67 1.7956 92 3.3856 
0.7396 68 1.8496 93 3.4596 
0.7744 69 1.9044 94 3.5344 
0.81 70 1.96 95 3.61 
0.8464 71 2.0164 96 3.6864 
0.8836 72 2.0736 97 3.7636 
0.9216 73 2.1316 98 3.8416 
0.9604 74 2.1904 99 3.9204 
75 2.25 100 4 
Appendix C 
Round ~Probability of 
Game Ending ‘ 





















一 CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
mUMlMll ； 
0D35Tfl7b0 
